The Cases Barclaycard seemingly want to forget all about -

after all Global Law, government interference &

foreign philosophies have won the day - or have they for

THE CONSTITUTION KEEPERS are on the March!

Yet another case of being a claimant, paying your court fees (not returned) and taking a Bank to court in relation to a House of Lords Edict and having the case

mysteriously removed and in effect being found guilty yourself!!!!!!

The Long Events are listed here - Go on! Enjoy!!!!!!!

We wrote on the 8th. February 2012

and we still await answers to the questions and proper response to the logs ........

08/02/2012 17:45:47

Barclaycard,

Barclays Bank PLC

P.O. Box 9131,

51, Saffron Road,

LEICESTER,

LE18 9DE.

Dear Sir or Madam,

E M L GRIFFITHS

Serious Complaint re.

the Actions of Barclaycard Against Me and My Family

For Now Alleged Account Numbers – please see enclosed log

I write to you carefully listing the now alleged accounts I have had with you, with copies of this letter to the Financial Ombudsman Service and the Crown Prosecution Service for I passionately believe both criminal and civil law has been broken by your company, it being very easy for me to prove this by the enclosed logs of your activities.

At a time when credibility of banking is seriously being questioned in our country, I am putting to you that due to the severity of attack by your company towards us, it would be far better to “put your hands up≠” and admit what we put to you are clear serious breaches of Constitutional Law & Modern Law both civil and criminal.

# This is an expression meaning to be open about serious errors of operation.

I, my family and the nation are waiting to hear the word “sorry” and action to put things right for I put to you that we have been victims of what we believe to be a vicious operation of attack against us by your company.

Our examination of events has been thorough, our angle coming from the side of British Constitutional Law with the crest and all it stands for that is at the back of every Judge’s seat in the land meaning something for the 1534 Act of Supremacy insists the Monarch of the Crest suppress all foreign infiltrations into our legal processes.

In this context I intend to prove that you have use foreign laws and customs against us that are contrary to British Law, a point we are putting to the Financial Ombudsman and the CPS reminding them that there is no electoral mandate for integrating legal and political processes into British Law, the demand on the Monarch being to suppress all this; 1534 Act of Supremacy.

We are putting towards the Ombudsman and CPS our conviction that your company is guilty of breaking the 1997 Harassment Act in its dealing with us at a time we were taking you to court. In addition we intend to prove that your company was guilty of “Perverting the Course of Justice” at the same time whilst a court case was pending.

We put to you that examination of the logs proves the following:

I. Before not paying you on what became alleged accounts we had taken professional legal advice and that was you had not met the provisions stated by the House of Lords to make the accounts enforceable. The fact that we have paid other accounts up to you up to date proves our policy to be correct.

II. What the logs show is that you mercilessly hit us with collecting agent after collecting agent thus we put to you breaking the provisions of the Protection of Harassment Act 1997 Section 1 and Section 40 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970. Harassing someone who is taking you to court is we put to you very serious in British Law and we are asking the Crown Prosecution Service to act in relation to the breaking of criminal law and the Financial Ombudsman to act in relation to the breaking of civil law. We can show from May 2009 you continued to harass us despite legal warnings from our Solicitors.

III. You have also very seriously broken Constitutional Law in that you in effect found EMLG guilty by registering defaults on a disputed accounts with credit reference agencies thus pre-empting a court’s decision on the accounts. We put to you that by these actions you have been using foreign law systems in our case with you, foreign law systems of Corpus Juris rather than Habeas Corpus.

IV. If our information is correct at least two of the agencies you set upon me and my family are owned by Barclays. These are Mercers and Calder who have the same address so it would seem when Mercers failed you set Calder on us along with a whole heap of other agencies. Remembering this harassment was whilst cases were on their way to court and so in effect we put to you that you changed identity before a hearing. Not legal we say and we are asking the Crown Prosecution Service to issue proceedings against you in relation toPerverting the Course of Justice.

V. In the Monarch’s Diamond Jubilee Year Her Majesty’s Coronation Oath will no doubt be brought to the attention of the nation. One of her promises on behalf of the nation to God is this:Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?" We believe we are proving that you have not kept the constitutional customs set out in our Constitutional Acts and you will note the only philosophy allowed to be used in our nation in legal matters – the laws of God not utilitarianism as we show in our presentation of the McGuffick v RBofS so called test case that seems to be part of putting out the court system our cases against Barclaycard. As my husband and I are ordained Ministers of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law we are saying constitutionally we can bring your Bank to account for its behaviour. This we do! On 28 07 09 we asked your Calder Agency – Juris or Habeas Corpus to which question we got no reply. By defaulting whilst a case is on its way to court we say you areJuris.

VI. For a long time your company denied that the accounts were in dispute and then you admitted the dispute. How is it therefore you did not withdraw the default reference from the Credit Reference Agencies when you admitted a dispute. How can a disputed account be defaulted?We insist by British Law that you immediately remove all adverse comment from the credit file of E M Lindsay Griffiths and suggest you advise us of compensation you are offering in relation to the inability to fully trade by EMLG.

VII. On 04 June 2009 I (EMLG) had become ill with the constant barrage of phone calls from your many agencies, Barclaycard not responding to the notice from MSB Solicitors to Mercers in relation to the breaking of two laws, Administration of Justice Act and the Protection from Harassment Act. What kind of compensation are you offering for breaking these laws and causing sickness out of the stress and pressure of it all? We put to you that your company has been a bully and we put to you that we on behalf of the nation are facing up to you. London Mayoral Candidate Ken Livingstone when pressed on banking in this country declared that “the world was run by monsters”. I have to tell you after all the suffering we have endured, this is our experience with you and we declare it has to stop and proper compensation paid.

VIII. Cases Coming Out of Court: We have looked into this and in our report on the now well-known McGuffick v Royal Bank of Scotland Test Case we have easily shown unconstitutional foreign influence on the findings of the Honourable Justice Flaux whose career we have shown to have utilitarian philosophical leanings rather than those demanded upon in the oath of H M The Queen whose crest every Judge in the land sits under! I enclose proof of this.In addition to this, it is legally correct to point out our position as Ministers of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law, for our position is there in the Oath itself. We are applying the rights given to us in this case stating that the Constitutional Principles have not been applied in this case.

IX. On the two accounts we have continued with you and regularly paid you have suspended use of them, and on one of them charged a PAYMENT BREAK PLAN of about sixteen pounds a month! What is that? We did not order it to our knowledge?

Please find enclosed the logs and our report on the McGuffick v RBofS Case which is seen as a test case relating to the now alleged accounts we have had with you.

You can see what our research has found out, our case being that the findings of this case did not relate to our cases with you at all and so we are still pursuing the legal action that now includes the additional points that have been raised in this letter.

Yours faithfully,

Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths

Dr David P Griffiths

Kicking the Devil Out of the Banks!
CASE STILL ONGOING IN 2023!

2) The Logs

09/02/2012 21:10:21

E M L GRIFFITHS

Serious Complaint re.

the Actions of Barclaycard Against Me and My Family

The Logs.

a) Barclaycard that was Morgan Stanley and Goldfish:

5301 2710 1411 1001.

When the account was numbered 5505 3430 0182 7271 our solicitors MSB Solicitors of Liverpool considered the account UNENFORCEABLE on 28th. April 2009.

We stopped paying the account on 29. April 2009 with the balance at £4,252-21 awaiting a court hearing. It is simply our policy to pay all undisputed accounts and so if a case is on its way to court then we consider the account to be in dispute.

We endured considerable harassment from Collecting Agents Mercers & Calders (both seemingly owned by Barclays) & so in my view they perverted the course of justice by changing identity with a court hearing on the way at that time. Seriously illegal in my view!

They then passed the now alleged account to Debt Managers Ltd. On 6. January they recognised an on-going dispute despite of Barclaycard denials returning the account to Barclays.

The Saga:

I. 28 04 09: Issue of a Notice from MSB Solicitors considering the agreement as it stands unenforceable by virtue of Section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit and/or Section 78/77 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The balance (now alleged) was at £4252-21.

II. 04 05 09: Letter from EMLG to Barclaycard (Morgan Stanley) saying future correspondence was to be between themselves & MSB, a request you ignored for great harassment was to follow.

III. 31 05 09: Request for Payment from Collections Manager.

IV. 17 06 09: Request for Payment from Collections Manager with threats of affecting credit rating.We regard threatening customers taking your company to Court as very serious going against all the legal customs of our nation since the coming in of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 which we believe your company has broken.

V. 26 07 09: Default Notice served through Mercers with alleged balance of £4,501-64. Whilst a Court Hearing is Pending an an account is in dispute with Solicitors you issue a default affecting EMLG ability to trasde. We believe this to be illegal for you have decided guilt by registering this with Credit Reference Agencies making no comment that the account is in dispute.

VI. 28 07 09: EMLG reply to Mercers not recognising “Default” and referring to MSB Solicitors.

VII. 28 07 09: EMLG reply to Calder asking Habeas or Juris.Another apparent agency now comes on the scene called Calder who we believe to be another of your companies so in the build-up to a court hearing you are harassing us using two different names! We say Perverting the Couse of Justice” and we now are reporting this to the CPS for their consideration in relation of bring a conviction for breaking the Harassment Act of 1997, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as well as the very serious charge of perverting the course of Justice.

VIII. 09 08 09: Threat from Mercers to send local debt collector. Did not happen!

IX. 25 08 09: Further threat from Mercers to send local debt collector. Did not happen!These threats were ongoing from your company in its guise as being another company it would seem!

X. 08 09 09: Section 78 Copy sent.

XI. 09 09 09: Intimation to Barclaycard of passing info onto MSB.

XII. 17 09 09: Letter from EMLG to Mercers pointing out their use of social rather than business stationery.Various aggressive techniques were being used by your agencies at this time putting very great upset and pressure on our family.

XIII. 29 10 09: Notice from Calder threatening summons, bailiffs, taking money out of wages, local collector, adverse credit rating.None of this has happened and all this was going on when a case was on its way to course, the so called test case that seems to have taken our case out of course we in this letter to you, the Financial Ombudsman and the CPS as illegal.

XIV. 02 11 09: Intimation from MSB Solicitors – still waiting documentation.

XV. 09 11 09: Told of CMC in Manchester – outcome very positive. We were being told by our solicitors at this time of a very likely win against your company at this time.

XVI. 23 11 09: Overlimit charge – but I had not used the card that was in dispute.You were still adding charges to the account when the case was pending, we say illegally!

XVII. 03 12 09: Reply letter to Elaine Mockler asking Habeas or Juris.This is a crucial point in our case for really we were asking your Elaine Mockler whether she was using British systems or foreign systems of law for in Britain our customs is to wait for the findings of a court before finding who is liable for what. We were patient, we put to you that you were breaking the protections of the 1997 Harassment Act in continually harassing us with agency after agency chasing us.

XVIII. 23 12 09: Notice of Formal Demand from Debt Managers Ltd of Edinburgh with alleged balance now at £4840-64.The balance keeps going up with you!

XIX. 01 01 10: EMLG reply to Debt Managers given story and constitutional principle we live our lives by.

XX. 05 01 10: Urgent Final demand from Debt Managers with threats of court action, court costs, adverse credit rating.

XXI. 06 01 10: Debt Managers Close File & return account to Barclaycard.This agency got very heavy with us but on being told our case and the Constitutional Position we live by, they return the file to you.

XXII. 01 02 09: Phone call from Apex Credit chasing account who on told of dispute say returning account to Barclaycard.You tried someone else!

XXIII. 12 03 10 Intimation from MSB re. UPDATE – emphasis on s.78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 – true copy.News from our Solicitors.

XXIV. 08 04 10 Intimation saying we now liable according to High Court!!!!!!!This is when we heard that our case was not going to be heard in court due to an apparent test case! A detailed study of the legality of this case has been undertaken that appears later in this report.

XXV. 2012 - Feb & August: Letter/invoice, Log, McGuffick case appraisal sent

6th. June 2013: Still awaiting reply!

What we are now putting to Barclaycard on this matter:

We put to you that despite of you being told that the case was on its way to a Court Hearing you pressed on with serious harassment against me and my family. These calls that were often aggressive caused great distress to us all here.

You were told of our Constitutional Position but did not back off. We were patient. You were not.

That you illegally defaulted me whilst awaiting a result of a hearing. This now has affected my ability to trade and there needs to be an immediate withdrawal of the default and considerable compensation paid from your company to me as recompense for the harassment plus recompense for my inability to trade.

We are putting to you that we are asking the Financial Ombudsman to look into your practices on disputed accounts and it is clear this was one. We are asking the CPS to proceed towards a criminal prosecution in the area of harassment, perverting the course of justice and deciding a result of a court case before a hearing and black listing me thus deciding my guilt.

That Barclaycard has acted unconstitutionally, has acted against modern law both civil and criminal, your company needing to be shamed by the nation before being able to grow again on proper constitutional foundations.

…………………………………………………………………………………….

b) Barclaycard: 4929 4705 6295 7006

This is a long running saga and I take it from 10. October 2008

I. 10 10 08: Letter from MSB considering unenforceability virtue of Section 127 (3) Consumer Credit Act 1974.

II. 03 12 08: EMLG informed by Joanna Connolly, Solicitor, MSB, Liverpool that Barclaycard had been informed that the agreement is “irredeemably unenforceable.” (Please note a definite statement here – not a consideration.)

At this point the account was showing at £10,977-02)

III. 20 01 09: Letter to EMLG from Colin Sefton, Legal Regulatory Compliance, Barclaycard seemingly arguing with the edict of Joanna Connolly.

Comment: If a professional solicitor has issued an edict to a company – then the company has argued back – then there is a DISPUTE! At the very least Barclaycard should not have abused us the way they did during a dispute and build up to a very likely court hearing as it was at the time. This has included defaulting and harassing EMLG. This is wrong and illegal. We are very emphatic about this in what is now our quest for justice.

IV. 01 02 09: Request for payment from Barclaycard for an amount now grown to £11,222-98. The format of the request was the same as was to come from Mercers.Balance size keeps growing whilst account in dispute!

V. 11 02 09: Reply from EMLG to Ms Dineen & Mr Sefton of Barclaycard stating that the account was in dispute despite of Mr. Sefton’s denial.Comment: It seems to be a strategy by banks to deny a dispute to enable them to harass former customers to make them give up. We did not! The issue of EMLG credit record was raised to as Barclaycard seemed to go for the credit file and even default EMLG on a disputed account. We firmly state ILLEGAL! The issue of Barclaycard’s threats was raised too.

VI. 15 02 09: Letter from Barclaycard threatening to wop EMLG credit record which they seem to have done. A credit record previously clean.They showed an account owing of £11,231-57

VII. Letter from MSB to EMLG saying papers sent to counsel.This is MSB Solicitors saying our papers had been sent to counsel, yet Barclaycard were pre-empting the Court Case by defaulting and adding on interest. We say illegal!

VIII. 26 02 09: Barclaycard letter to say they were sorry to learn of EMLG dissatisfaction. They aimed to resolve matters by 19 March 2009. We are still waiting!

IX. 14 03 09: Serious Harassment Complaint from EMLG to Barclaycard. Statement from EMLG about family life being affected by barrage of phone calls.

X. 18 03 09: Letter from Barclaycard Customer Relationship Unit saying they aimed toresolve matters by 20 04 09. We are still waiting!

XI. 19 03 09: DG E Mail to MSB Solicitors giving information about Barclaycard harassment!

XII. 20 03 09: Serious Harassment Complaint from EMLG to Barclaycard.The harassment my family had to endure was horrendous. This is horribly wrong! It is a disgrace for Barclaycard to behave in such a manner!

XIII. 20 03 09: Letter received from Candice Skelton, Customer Relationship Manager, Barclaycard referring to our request to stop the harassing phone calls. She stated that we were aware that our account had become overdue for payment.We most certainly were not aware of this. We were aware of a dispute only! We seem to be referred to one of their agents, professional debt counselling service, CAB or Consumer Credit Counselling Service – or contact Financial Ombudsman Service.The letter made no sense to us as we were in dispute using professional solicitors – MSB Solicitors.

XIV. 21 03 09: Letter from EMLG to Ms Dineen, Colin Sefton of Barclaycard, JC & SA of MSB –Plea for a sensible way forward without the considerable Barclaycard harassment.

XV. 23 03 09: Reply from Lewis Cook, Customer Relationship Manager, Barclaycard which seems to be a complete copy of letter of 20 03 09 – Candice Skelton.Evidence here of Barclaycard replying with standard letters rather than addressing the specific issues intimated by EMLG in her letters.

XVI. 25 03 09: Reply from EMLG to Barclaycard’s Candice Skelton & Lewis Cook as they seem to have replied with an identical reply without regard to previous correspondence. EMLG denies stating that phone calls be stopped – but emphasises that it was the harassment that had to be stopped. EMLG stated a longing for sensible dialogue. We believe we are entitled to substantial compensation for the harassment we endured. EMLG states she most certainly unaware of overdue account but aware of disputed one.Habeas Corpus mentioned in the context of awaiting a court hearing and to harass in the build up to a court hearing broke across all well established British codes of behaviour. Refers to Barclaycard’s reference to “difficult time for us” with reply about the well documented “difficult time” for banks! Refers to Barclaycard’s statement of having to give factual information to Credit Reference Agencies. In a dispute, however, we are legally entitled to give our side to the agencies but under this unconstitutional system it would seem we would be denied that. A desire for dialogue was again intimated.

It is a fundamental right of a customer to hold payment during a dispute. It is fundamental right not to have to endure harassment from the other side before a coming Court Hearing.

XVII. 01 04 10: Further letter from EMLG to Dineen & Sefton of Barclaycard & JC & SA of MSB – Complaint of Barclaycard’s reply to our letters with standard letters – not specific addressing of issues. Complaint to Barclaycard that despite of us being up front to them – we have been subject to great harassment. Constitutional issue raised again building up to our statement that we believe that there is Treason operating here with Barclaycard as they have ignored the country’s constitutional way of operating law in preference to global systems.

Yes, we believe it to be fundamentally wrong to harass the opposing party in what was scheduled to be a coming court case.

XVIII. 05 04 09: Default Notice issued by Mercers who seem to be owned by Barclaycard so they have changed identity to issue this. As Barclaycard had been informed of our intention to take the matter to court – it seems to us that Barclaycard have “perverted the course of justice” by their actions.

Alleged Account balance now at £11719-30. As it would seem Mercers is owned by Barclays we believe it fundamentally wrong for the defence in a coming court hearing to default a disputed account and pretend to be someone else thus perverting the course of justice.

XIX. 06 04 09: EMLG Letter To Mercers referring them to MSB.

XX. 07 04 09: Letter from EMLG to Ann Vivemar & Karen Conman of Mercers stating their default notice “not recognised” stating to them that they had not recognised the account in dispute and that the principles of Habeas Corpus had been breached.

Not recognised by us but recognised by people we need to trade with so EMLG now can only trade in a limited way.

XXI. 14 04 09: Barclaycard Reply re. Robert Wallace. Denies being involved in harassment or criminal activity.We believe Barclaycard have broken the Harassment Act, 1997, perverted the course of justice and acted treasonably by not recognising a dispute on its way to as court hearing at that time.

XXII. 16 04 09: Reply from EMLG to Wallace of Barclaycard. Stated by EMLG that all payments up to date till statement of MSB Solicitors of their consideration on the matter.

We believe that it is plainly obvious that a dispute has been well and truly determined by all this and that Barclaycard have illegally and disgracefully operated in harassing us and not referring to a now “alleged” account.

XXIII. 20 04 09: Elaine Mockler of Barclaycard letter with Barclaycard Terms and Conditions.

XXIV. 20 04 09: Further letter from Barclaycard with Terms and Conditions and balance (still not saying “alleged”) of £11,719-30.

XXV. 21 04 09: Mercers Notice of threat to send local debt collector to our home. Did not happen!

XXVI. 22 04 09: Letter from EMLG to Mr. Dave Clark of Mercers confirming our referring to MSB Solicitors

XXVII. 23 04 09: Warning issued by EMLG to Mercers to use the term “alleged” in future.

We argue if a case is on its way to court to determine if a body has kept the terms given out by a House of Lords edict – then the word “alleged” should be used when referring to what has become an alleged balance.

XXVIII. 23 04 09: Wallace of Barclaycard denies harassment & criminal activity by Barclaycard. We disagree giving further evidence of a dispute.

WE put it forward that it is plainly obvious that we have had to endure harassment illegal under all forms of law.

XXIX. 30 03 09: Candice Skelton of Barclaycard sorry we remain dissatisfied! Tells of six months to contact Financial Ombudsman service.

Why should we inform the Financial Ombudsman when the case was already in the legal process – unless they knew something we did not know?

XXX. 01 05 09: MSB Letter to Mercers in which MSB warns of a formal complaint being issued to the Office of Fair Trading & other relevant authorities under Section 40 Administration of Justice Act 1970 & Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The harassment continued with Barclaycard passing the “alleged” account around different named operations that seem to have all been owned by Barclays.

XXXI. 01 05 09: Evidence of this harassment continuing from Mercers with a threat of a local debt collector turning up at our home to collect full payment.

Mercers took no notice of the warning from our Solicitors. What is the point of solicitors letters when they are taken no notice of?

XXXII. 07 05 09: Letter from Barclaycard Public Relations Team saying they aim to resolve matters by 29 05 09. We are still waiting!

XXXIII. 15 05 09: Letter from Barclaycard Public Relations Team saying they aim to resolve matters by 05 06 09. We are still waiting!

XXXIV. 26 05 09: Phil Clark puts Barclaycard’s side in a letter. We have put our side showing there is a dispute!

XXXV. 27 05 09: Frances Chambers puts Barclaycard’s side in a letter. We have put our side showing there is a dispute!

XXXVI. 28 05 09: Donna Farley puts Barclaycard’s side in a letter. We have put our side showing there is a dispute!

XXXVII. 04 06 09: Mercers “48 hour Notice” issued with a account owing notice of £12,226-07 so they are adding to the balance during a dispute. Massively adding to the balance!

XXXVIII. 04 06 09: Letter from EMLG to MSB Solicitors stating severe harassment from both Barclaycard and Mercers in a time of legal action and a dispute. Lindsay had become ill under this pressure and Doctor’s visits occurred. EMLG asked MSB to consider a complaint to the Office of Fair Trading. EMLG quoted Administration of Justice Act 1970 to MSB. EMLG expresses a view to MSB that Barclaycard had broken criminal law in relation to the Harassment Act of 1997.

WE believe this absolutely to be the case!

XXXIX. 13 06 09: Letter from EMLG to MSB Solicitors intimating a believed use by Barclaycard of European legal systems (prohibited under the 1534 Act of Supremacy) rather than British Habeas Corpus.

We believe Barclaycard have broken principles of British Constitutional Law.

XL. 16 06 09: First Intimation from Power 2 Contact of Crewe (looks like Barclays company) stating it would seem that they are a “finding” agency.

Why did Barclays use a finding agency? We had not moved and we had solicitors on the case who had not moved!

XLI. E Mail from DG to Joanna & Sam (MSB Solicitors) showing the Act of Supremacy 1534 (in context of use of foreign legal systems)

XLII. 17 06 09: Letter from EMLG to Power to Contact referring them to MSB.

XLIII. 19 06 09: Power to Contact confirmation of passing on information to relevant client.

XLIV. 24 06 09: Confirmation from MSB of a Cease & Desist Letter to Power to Contact.

Barclaycard had denied harassment. Warnings from MSB Solicitors had been issued and now a Cease and Desist Letter!

XLV. 29 06 09: Letter to MSB saying we are seriously considering taking Barclays to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

This is what we are doing now in our letter to the Crown Prosecution Service.

XLVI. 29 06 09: Letter to Dineen of Barclaycard stating no payments whilst account in dispute.

We believe it to be a fundamental right not to have to pay what is now an alleged account during a dispute.

XLVII. Series of Questions were thought out by DG over the behaviour of Barclays in this, to be asked of Barclays. These began with the statement: Bearing in mind it is well known in departments of Barclaycard and MSB that we are in process of taking Barclaycard to court .......

· Do you believe it is legal for one party to hound another whilst a case is on its way to court?

· Do you believe it is legal for one party to describe itself under another name whilst a court hearing is on the way as it was at this time? (Mercers and Calder are seemingly owned by Barclays so when MSB sent a Cease and Desist letter to one – the alleged account was passed to another.)

· Do you believe it is legal to ignore solicitors’ letters asking you to contact them rather than harass us?

· Do you believe it is right for us to be compensated for legal breaches that caused stress and illness to EMLG – Doctor’s visits occurred! (phone call after phone call – threat after threat harassment)

· Do you believe it is right to threaten home visits by collectors when a case is on its way to a court hearing?

· During the time the matter was on its way to a court hearing – do you think it is right to refer to a balance in notices – rather than an “alleged” balance?

· During the time the matter was on its way to a court hearing – do you think it is right to “default” EMLG?

· In amongst all this activity – do you think it is right for us to negotiate with people who have behaved in what we would call an unconstitutional way?

XLVIII. 29 06 09: Intimation from MSB that Counsel had agreed to act on a “no win – no fee basis” and that you needed a Court Issue fee of £150.

XLIX. 05 07 09: Calder Financial (another operation of Barclays it would seem) come on the scene with them saying we owe £12,486-79. It keeps going up!!!!!!Their intimation threatens summons costs but it is us who are taking them to court! Other threats are included increasing the harassment. How much more evidence do we need to get a criminal conviction against them under the Harassment Act of 1997?????

Despite of being told time after time that we were taking Barclaycard to court – Calder now threaten us with summons charges!!!!!!! This is HARASSMENT!

L. 08 07 09: DG Letter to Sam & Joanna of MSB Solicitors. We obtained information of Mercers & Calder really being Barclays meaning that in the processes of us taking them to a court hearing – they changed identity.

Reading legal intimation on Perverting the Course of Justice the activities of Barclays in changing identity clearly show that this has taken place.

LI. 08 07 09: Letter from EMLG to Colin Rogers of Calder who have the same address as Mercers which surely shows an identity change.

EMLG intimates no payments on accounts in dispute.

LII. 08 07 09: Letter from Barclaycard Public Relations Team to EMLG: Barclaycard letter to say they were sorry to learn of EMLG dissatisfaction. They aimed to resolve matters by 28 July 2009.

We are still waiting!

LIII. 14 07 09: Letter from Frances Chambers, Barclaycard relating to Section 78 of Consumer Credit Act 1974. Seems to relate to what they have sent out but not to more serious complaints intimated in this summary.

LIV. 28 07 09: ADMISSION BY BARCLAYCARD THAT THERE IS A DISPUTE by Stacey Shaw, Customer Relationship Manager. We now have an acknowledged dispute and so why all the harassment, systems against us rather than dialogue with solicitors? PROOF TOO THAT BARCLAYCARD HAD DEFAULTED EMLG during the time of an acknowledged dispute.

This is highly significant because up until now Barclaycard had not intimated that there had been a dispute – now there is an acknowledgement of a dispute so how then has the harassment been legal on a now fully accepted dispute?

LV. 01 08 09: Acknowledgement back to Stacey Shaw with Solicitors details.

LVI. 01 08 09: DPG letter to Sam Audley pointing out Barclaycard’s acknowledgement of dispute. Even though they have acknowledged a dispute – they still say they are entitled to continue collections activity!

This does not make sense!

LVII. 02 08 09: Formal Demand for Payment from Calder – now at

£12,728-50 having put onto the bill £1751-48 during the period of an acknowledged dispute!

LVIII. 05 08 09: EMLG letter to Joanne King, Calder referring them to MSB Solicitors

LIX. 12 08 09: First letter and phone calls from new agency called RMA of Preston. Threats of sending debt collectors, CCJ’s etc.

Agency after agency against us & just as Barclaycard denied a dispute and then admitted a dispute – can we reach a point of establishing the fact that they harassed us time after time.

LX. 18 08 09: Letter from EMLG to Joanna & Sam in relation to unconstitutional & illegal behaviour by Barclaycard. Question about other accounts on MSB books.

LXI. 18 08 09: Letter to RMA referring them to MSB Solicitors.

LXII. 25 08 09: Letter to Sam Audley MSB informing of RMA harassment

LXIII. 25 08 09: Letter to RMA referring them to MSB.

LXIV. 02 09 09: Notice from RMA stating that Barclaycard had agreed to accept a settlement of current outstanding debt of £12,728-50. This alleged debt had grown by £1751-48.

We never accepted this as owing.

LXV. 08 09 09: Notice from RMA saying they cannot help us if we do not speak to them. The problem with this is – is that we had given Barclaycard every opportunity to speak to MSB Solicitors.

LXVI. 09 09 09: Notice from MSB that our claim issued at Liverpool County Court.

So it is a fact we had the claim in court. It is a fact therefore that the defendant had harassed us & threatened us whilst a matter was on its way to court!

LXVII. 09 09 09: On same day that court hearing intimated EMLG informs RMA to deal with MSB and not harass us!

LXVIII. 11 09 09: Just two days after MSB notice of the claim being issued at Liverpool County Court – transfer notice to Manchester to go before His Honour Judge Waksman.

Not just one court, but now the second!

LXIX. 12 09 09: Reply from DPG to JC & SA at MSB.

It was pointed out that we had respected the House of Lords ruling and endured merciless harassment. We had noted treasonable activity, perverting the course of justice and failure to keep to Cease and Desist edicts.

LXX. 22 09 09: RMA letter looking for payment arrangement.

LXXI. 28 09 09: Letter from Stacey Shaw, Barclaycard saying we should carry on paying the debt.

This person has already acknowledged a dispute so who pays accounts in dispute awaiting a court hearing? It is a fundamental right not to pay an account in dispute!

LXXII. 28 09 09: EMLG further referral to MSB for RMA.

LXXIII. 29 09 09: RMA letter saying we had failed to keep the agreedpayment plan.

Since when was there an agreed payment plan? So we have a letter with false information sent!

LXXIV. 06 10 09: Above point made to RMA in reply letter from EMLG.

LXXV. 13 10 09: RMA reply letter from Jon Huckfield. States account on hold!

LXXVI. 16 10 09: JC letter (MSB) to EMLG thanking for Barclaycard correspondence requesting we continue to send the info. This we have done!

LXXVII. 06 11 09: Further letter from Stacey Shaw, Barclaycard saying she has nothing further to add!

NO CORRESPONDENCE between 06 11 09 and 18 01 10

LXXVIII. 18 01 10: JC (MSB) letter saying our claim was listed for a hearing on 2. February 2010. Due to a ruling by His Honour Judge Waksman our claim has been removed.We have not gone through all this to have our claim removed on the notion that our creditor has now complied with MSB requests for documentation under s78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The fact is that Barclaycard had not complied with the House of Lords Edict & that something was going on behind the scenes to see these case out of court. This “something” we have studied and put in this report.

LXXIX. 16 06 10 Letter from Apex Credit Management Ltd looking for us to pay.

LXXX. 28 06 10 Threat from Apex “Home Visit Appointment”

LXXXI. 28 06 10 Saying our info passed onto Barclaycard and account on hold!

LXXXII. 28 06 10 Letter from APEX Josh Lorento saying account closed on their systems.

LXXXIII. July 10 Letter from Wescot saying they are now here

LXXXIV. Reply to Wescot saying we can send further information

LXXXV. 28 07 10 Wescot ask for further information

LXXXVI. 30 07 10 Wescot sent further information

LXXXVII. 09 08 10 Wescot saying investigation on way

LXXXVIII. 10 08 10 Barclaycard acknowledgement

LXXXIX. 14 09 10 Barclaycard letter saying informing Wescot to proceed with formal recovery.

XC. 15 09 10 Letter from Wescot saying they have backed out

XCI. 29 09 10 Letter to Barclaycard

One can only say, "What a mess"!

XCII 2012 – Feb and August: Letter/Invoice, Log, McGuffickCase Appraisal sent

XCIII. 09 02 12 House of Lords Info Letter to Barclaycard

XCIV. 09 02 12 Logs Letter to Barclaycard

XCV. 09 07 12 Reminder Letter

XCIV. 08 08 12 Further Reminder Letter

6th. June 2013 - no reply or attempt to solve these issues!

………………………………………………………………………………….

c) BARCLAYCARD 4929 4231 0571 7007

Use suspended by Barclaycard despite of up to date payments

Why am I paying a PAYMENT BREAK PLAN of about sixteen pounds a month on this account? I do not know what this is!

………………………………………………………………………………………….

d) 4929 4260 4134 5007 Barclaycard Platinum:

Use suspended by Barclaycard despite of up to date payments

………………………………………………………………………………………………

The McGuffick Test Case and how it relates to Barclaycard!

09/02/2012 21:10:21

E M L GRIFFITHS

Serious Complaint re. the Actions of Barclaycard Against Me and My Family

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 1

Rev David P Griffiths investigates

This is quite a saga for those like my wife Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths PhD D Min who took out credit card and loan agreements pre-2007, agreements we put forward have not been adhered to by banking institutions. We using MSB Solicitors of Liverpool were taking these institutions to court in relation to a House of Lords edict that identified breakages by such institutions of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act thus making in effect the agreements null and void as one side had not kept to the requirements of the agreements.

In effect in Christian Terms - one side had broken their side of an agreement by not keeping to laws that surround that agreement which is our presentation of the argument backed up by a House of Lords edict, an edict we put forward was suppressed by a test case that we believe had utilitarian discussions going on in the background that came about as a result of the banking crisis, and European references in the test case - illegal if the nation is keeping to its God given Constitutional Acts.

Acts of Parliament which are all signed by the Monarch thus placing them all under our Constitutional Acts are there to protect the people, and in this case the House of Lords was simply doing its job as the House is in effect is the highest court in the land constitutionally under God.

According to the Elizabethan Settlement this God part places ecclesiastical persons in position to ensure our nation is run under the principles clearly outlined in our Constitutional Acts. Within this context I have been firmly led by the Lord to take action here not only against the institutions in question but also against a utilitarian infiltration that has manifest alongside foreign influence to a particular legal case.

This is being presented here as our test case to prove the illegality of such influences that are effecting the decisions of our Highest Court in the Land! The repercussions of the actions we are taking here will bring much relief to hard pressed citizens of our nation that have in our view been taken by a banking system that has not adhered to our Constitutional Acts, their motivation coming from the spirit of mammon rather than the God of our Constitution.

God is looking for a national repentance and a Commonwealth of Nations that has a banking community working with a helping the people rather than using behind the scenes manipulations to suppress our hard won Christian Heritage, a heritage our military over two world wars fought for and gave their lives for.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 2

In relation to current legal actions that have now been taken out of the legal process, hence our legal ability to name specific cases on this site, we now move on from our presentation of the House of Lords case shown in Part 1 to see how the House of Lords ruling seems to have been cancelled out by a Court Hearing conducted by the Honourable Mr Justice Flaux. We believe we can show Utilitarianism as a philosophy being used in relation to British Law as well as unconstitutional references to European Law and the European Court of Justice.

Presented by Rev. Dr. David P Griffiths PhD DD

Clergyman of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath

was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?"
King and Queen, "All this I promise to do."

After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand

upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

"The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God."

Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book. IV. And be it enacted, That the said oath shall be in like manner administered to every King and Queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of this Realm, at their respective coronations, by one of the archbishops or bishops of this Realm of England, for the time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective coronations; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

Rev. Dr. David P Griffiths PhD DD hereby uses his right as an Ordained Clergy man of the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law" to ensure the laws of God are maintained in the nation, to truly profess the true Gospel and the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law."

In relation to the Protestant Elizabethan Settlement I will expose all foreign infiltration into our legal processes and look to honour and respect British Law in line with H.M. Queen Elizabeth II oath to maintain the laws of God.

The Case McGuffick and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC

The case is outlined here with a summary on each of the 118 points following

Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWHC 2386 (Comm)Case No: 2009 Folio 910

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL06/10/2009

B e f o r e :

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FLAUX
____________________

Between:
PHILLIP McGUFFICK
Claimant
- and -

THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC

Defendant

____________________

Mr Andrew G. Moran QC and Mr Brendan Burke (instructed by MJP Justice Limited) for the Claimant
Mr Richard Handyside QC and Miss Julia Smith (instructed by DLAPiper UK LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 23rd and 24th September 2009
____________________

This case was heard on 23rd and 24th September 2009 and is described as an "Approved Judgment"!

Introduction

The introduction contains information on the history of the case that began at Chester County Court as one of a large number of claims before County Courts all over the country. The court document describes these cases as "disputes" whereas in our cases my wife Lindsay and I had experience of our cases being denied as being "a dispute".

This is particularly interesting in relation to our disputes with Barclaycard as for a long time Barclaycard rejected claims from us that we were in dispute, the admission of this not coming till later.

This case clearly shows a dispute and we argue to Barclaycard that one cannot default accounts in dispute without giving opportunity to us to put our side on the Credit Record.

Point 1 of the judgment refers to the 1974 Consumer Credit act as did the House of Lords ruling previously. The judgment refers to Section 77 of that act which renders agreements unenforceable in certain circumstances.

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 77

77 Duty to give information to debtor under fixed-sum credit agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

(1) The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and payment of a fee of [F1£1], shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer,—

(a) the total sum paid under the agreement by the debtor;

(b) the total sum which has become payable under the agreement by the debtor but remains unpaid, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date when each became due; and

(c) the total sum which is to become payable under the agreement by the debtor, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date, or mode of determining the date, when each becomes due.

(2)If the creditor possesses insufficient information to enable him to ascertain the amounts and dates mentioned in subsection (1)(c), he shall be taken to comply with that paragraph if his statement under subsection (1) gives the basis on which, under the regulated agreement, they would fall to be ascertained.

(3)Subsection (1) does not apply to—

(a)an agreement under which no sum is, or will or may become, payable by the debtor, or

(b)a request made less than one month after a previous request under that subsection relating to the same agreement was complied with.

(4)If the creditor under an agreement fails to comply with subsection (1)—

(a)he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement; F2. . .

(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(5)This section does not apply to a non-commercial agreement.

In the cases outlined to Barclaycard on the log it was understood by my wife and I through MSB Solicitors of Liverpool that Barclaycard could not meet the demands as outlined in Section 77 of the act.

This case (McGuffick) had been referred to this Commercial Court by His Honour Judge Halbert as a TEST CASE!

What we ask here is be it that this was one of many cases, and be it that a ruling had been given by the House of Lords, how is it that this case was going to be the same as all the other cases, there having been a distinction made in the Lords of two types of cases, namely "discretionary unenforceability" and irredeemably unenforceablity"!

The Essential Facts

Points 3 to 18 come under this heading in the judgment.

This particular case relates to a "fixed-sum regulated loan agreement" of 3rd. October 2005. The sum borrowed was £17,034, £20,781 to be apparently paid back in 60 monthly instalments of £346-35.

The Claimant in this case did not suggest that the agreement was improperly executed so Sections 61, 65 and 127 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 was according to the judgment not directly in issue.

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 61

Signing of agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless—

(a)a document in the prescribed form itself containing all the prescribed terms and conforming to regulations under section 60(1) is signed in the prescribed manner both by the debtor or hirer and by or on behalf of the creditor or owner, and

(b)the document embodies all the terms of the agreement, other than implied terms, and

(c)the document is, when presented or sent to the debtor or hirer for signature, in such a state that all its terms are readily legible.

(2)In addition, where the agreement is one to which section 58(1) applies, it is not properly executed unless—

(a)the requirements of section 58(1) were complied with, and

(b)the unexecuted agreement was sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer [F1by an appropriate method] not less than seven days after a copy of it was given to him under section 58(1), and

(c)during the consideration period, the creditor or owner refrained from approaching the debtor or hirer (whether in person, by telephone or letter, or in any other way) except in response to a specific request made by the debtor or hirer after the beginning of the consideration period, and

(d)no notice of withdrawal by the debtor or hirer was received by the creditor or owner before the sending of the unexecuted agreement.

(3)In subsection (2)(c), “the consideration period ” means the period beginning with the giving of the copy under section 58(1) and ending—

(a)at the expiry of seven days after the day on which the unexecuted agreement is sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer, or

(b)on its return by the debtor or hirer after signature by him,

whichever first occurs.

(4)Where the debtor or hirer is a partnership or an unincorporated body of persons, subsection (1)(a) shall apply with the substitution for “by the debtor or hirer ” of “by or on behalf of the debtor or hirer ”.

There is an obligation here for the Bank to prove this is in order but be it that there was many more cases than this one, cases where it would seem the banking institutions were unable to provide such proof - then how could this be a test case putting all the others it would seem out of court?

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 65

Consequences of improper execution. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)An improperly-executed regulated agreement is enforceable against the debtor or hirer on an order of the court only.

(2)A retaking of goods or land to which a regulated agreement relates is an enforcement of the agreement.

1974 Consumer Credit Act 1974 Section 127

Enforcement orders in cases of infringement.

E+W+S+N.I.

(1)In the case of an application for an enforcement order under—

(a)section 65(1) (improperly executed agreements), or

(b)section 105(7)(a) or (b) (improperly executed security instruments), or

(d) section 124(1) or (2) (taking of negotiable instrument in contravention of section 123),

the court shall dismiss the application if, but F1. . . only if, it considers it just to do so having regard to—

(i) prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question, and the degree of culpability for it; and

(ii) the powers conferred on the court by subsection (2) and sections 135 and 136.

(2) If it appears to the court just to do so, it may in an enforcement order reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or hirer, or any surety, so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention in question.

There is clearly here provision for cases were documentation has not been provided by the banking institution and even so if this case the bank has provided, again we ask, is this the case in all the other cases?

Point 4 relates to the specific monetary sums involved in this case, point 5 relating to a default notice that had been issued by the Bank as indeed does point 6 that refers to Credit Reference Agencies Callcredit plc; Equifax Europe Limited and Experian Limited, this default reference not only affecting the ability to get credit by the individual involved but also other members of the household in question for a period of up to six years.

We strongly question the legality of this, in this case and in all other cases. We in Britain have traditionally enjoyed living under the principles of Habeas Corpus which means that one is innocent before being found guilty in court. In the European system of Corpus Juris then it is up to the individual to prove his innocence.

This is not the case in Britain so here we have the Royal Bank of Scotland issuing a default notice on Mr McGuffick whilst the case is on its way to court and giving him a "criminal" record (in other words finding him guilty before a court case) by issuing notice to Credit Reference Agencies before his hearing, not only on him but members of his household too.

If this principle therefore operated in criminal law, when the Police arrested a man they could put the guilt of the man on record before going to court. In addition members of his household would be guilty too.

We regard this practice as an extreme example of the use of Corpus Juris, a system totally outlawed under British law and this way of operation should be resulting in an outrage amongst the British people whose whole tradition of law is being set upon by philosophies that have no place under our Constitution.

Even though Point 7 shows the Bank not adding interest during all of this, it does show that the Bank has already found him guilty thus pre-empting the Court decision of the Honourable Justice Flaux.

(IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT WHERE R B of S did not add interest during all of this – BARCLAYCARD MOST CERTAINLY DID making our Barclaycard Cases different to this one!)

EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POINT WHEN IT COMES TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW!

Point 8 refers to two agencies that attempted to receive funds from Mr McGuffick, that is Apex Credit Management and Capquest Debt Recovery Limited.

Point 9 refers to a letter dated 25th February 2009 from MJP Solictors for the claimant to Royal Bank of Scotland with a Section 77 Information Request.

The letter stated that the claimant considered the account to be in dispute and that no reference was to be given to Credit Reference agencies which is exactly our point.

Mr Guffick had given his solicitors opportunity to ascertain from the papers the Bank were to send whether the agreement was enforceable under sections 61 and 127 of the act.

It is noted under Point 9 that the Bank had received hundreds of similar requests from solicitors and claims management companies.

Point 10 outlines Section 77

Point 11 gives an admission from the Royal Bank of Scotland's Clare Price that although it was the practice of the Bank to keep all copies of credit agreements, it sometimes was not possible to comply with requests under Section 77 within the prescribed period.

Here it would seem that the Royal Bank of Scotland have admitted that sometimes they could not keep to the terms of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act within the prescribed period, but what they could do is default a customer whilst legal processes were going on.

WE PASSIONATELY DECLARE THIS ILLEGAL AS WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO DO AS PROTESTANT REFORMED MINISTERS THE MONARCH HAS AGREED TO TAKE NOTE OF - THE JUDGE BEING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MONARCH. OUR POINT HAS TO BE LISTENED TO BY LAW AND ABIDED BY!

Point 12 informs us that the Bank initially could not find a copy of the agreement and wrote to MJP to inform them of this.

It seems from Point 12 that there is a further incredible admission, the Bank stating to the claimant: in the circumstances, if the claimant decided not to meet his obligations under the agreement, the bank would not be able to enforce repayment of the loan.

Point 13 relates to correspondence by MJP threatening proceedings for a declaration of unenforceability by the court if the copy of the agreement was not produced within 28 days and for an injunction if the claimant's credit rating were affected.

Section 77 does have a time period stated, and even though by May 11 2009 the Bank had located a copy of the agreement, through inadvertence a signed statement of account as required by Section 77 had been overlooked.

There comes a question here that as the Bank could not provide a copy of the agreement in the prescribed period, this being admitted by the Bank, the same Bank on not being able to view a copy of the agreement defaulted an account blackening not only the name of Mr McGuffick but also his household. How can that be under British law or are we to find European Global law coming into the equation?

Point 14 shows that collection activity was again activated by the Bank on 13 May 2009 but on the Bank realising that the claimant had issued proceedings ceased the activity. This remained the case up till the hearing although Capquest had got involved by mistake, the Bank at this stage holding fire to enable the Court to decide.

It is clear however that the Bank had already pre-empted the hearing by defaulting before the hearing, putting disputed information to collection agencies before the hearing not only reducing the ability of Mr McGuffick to trade but also the ability of his household to trade also! This we present as aCorpus Juris style stranglehold on McGuffick in that the Bank had blacklisted him before the hearing, the backing off by the Bank on knowing the hearing was near is to us proof that the Bank was aware of the dangers of pre-empting a court decision.

The Relief Sought

Point 15 related to the relief sought by the claimant. It would seem from the evidence that the Royal Bank of Scotland had placed adverse information against McGuffick to Credit Reference Agencies in the process of the case being brought to this hearing. McGuffick was looking to obtain an injunction against the Bank doing what seemingly it had already done!

Indeed part 2 of Point 15 gives an alternative to the Court that if the Bank was entitled to continue reporting to CRA's and indeed it would seem they were still reporting even whilst accepting they had been in breach of Section 77 of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act - then the Court was being asked to make a statement of there being no enforceable liability.

We say - what a ludicrous situation! The Bank it would seem had accepted their breach of Section 77 yet was reporting against McGuffick whilst accepting their breach. It seems to us that it should have been Royal Bank of Scotland appearing on the Credit Reference Agency's record for being in breach of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act and that McGuffick was innocent!

But oh no! The Big Boy was the one with the access and be able to give an equivalent to a criminal record to McGuffick even though the case had not been heard in court yet and even though the Bank had admitted its breach.

Well if we are going to stick up for Habeas Corpus its now by saying that in our view this case has no link whatsoever with both the principles and actual law of our Constitutional Acts, and in addition that even when there is an admission of guilt which there seems to be by the Royal of Scotland - it is the victim of the breach that gets the equivalent of the criminal record.

We are blowing the trumpets in Zion, we are sounding the alarm in God's Holy Mountain with our deep conviction that this is not only illegal, not only immoral but also a breach of what our nation has held precious for centuries.

Joel 2:1 (King James Version)

Blow ye the trumpet in Zion, and sound an alarm in my holy mountain: let all the inhabitants of the land tremble: for the day of the LORD cometh, for it is nigh at hand;

Part 3 looked for a mandatory injunction for the Bank to inform the Credit Reference Agencies that McGuffick had not been in default after all and that from 11 March 2009 onwards the claimant's "default" was in a time of the Bank's breach of Section 77, the latter part 4 asking for a mandatory injunction ordering the bank to provide the claimant with a signed statement of account by Section 77(1).

The Parameters of the Case

Points 16 & 17 gives the way the case was to be conducted under certain parameters, the claimant's QC speaking for the claimant instead of emphasizing the very real constitutional points outlined in our commentary declared the case as not being as appropriate a test case as others might have been.

To us the "test case" had more than adequately shown the finding of guilt before a case, even when the Bank had seemingly admitted a breach.

The reason for the QC's comments however is outlined in that it would seem that the Claimant had admitted a time of validity which clearly in other cases this is not the case.

If this is the case there is clearly a major difference here, but why then should this case impact others cases to be taken out the system if there are major differences?

Point 17 does give further particular peculiarities to this case which certainly would not apply to many other cases.

Point 18 relates to the case being left open as to whether the agreement had properly set out the total charge for credit under Section 61(1)(a) and the regulations made under section 60(1)(b) of the 1974 Act, there being an apparent agreement with parties here that when the Bank had issued the agreement, then the agreement would come enforceable again.

Just because there seems to be an acceptance of this in this case, this does not mean that there would be similar agreements in every case!

The parameters in Point 19 further show the case to be one of temporary or redeemable unenforceability concerned only with Section 77 of the act.

This in our view is not good enough. Parameters are being put into place in this case which would in our view be antagonistic against the claimant. It is extremely serious to only cover one avenue of the Bank's behaviour. It is important as we do here to cover the behaviour of the Bank before the case and their action in effect finding McGuffick guilty by "criminalising him" before a hearing. It is our our view that this parameter brought about a false context to the case.

Mr MoranQC in Point 20 seems to be very generous to the defendant in Point 20 by asking the Judge to give guidance.

We have an admitted breach here and during the time of the breach Royal Bank of Scotland seemingly "criminalised" the claimant.

Mr Richard Handyside QC for the defendant seems to have taken this up not only to benefit his own client, the Royal Bank of Scotland but for all the banking institutions involved in these cases, that even though the case was a "test case," it would seem only the specifics to this case could be considered by the court because the wider issues which seem to be described here as "hyporhetical facts" as they relate to other cases not before the court could not be considered.

This is fair enough in our view as long as it is not a "test case". It is a "test case" however and of courses there are differences in this case to other cases. Of course a court could not decide on other cases so why has this case become part of a process pulling out all the other cases.

We see this as unconstitutional and illegal.

The Issues

Point 22 relates to Mr Handyside's list of issues with a skeleton argument not formally agreed that is nonetheless described as "a useful summary" even though to an extent the list had been overtaken by events!

Oh dear!

Point 23 is a summary of issues awaiting decision.

(1) This relates to £15,066-21 with a statement in the point that the figure had been outstanding under the agreement since June 2007.

Has the Court stopped using the word "alleged". The decision of the Court has not been given yet. We are awaiting the decision of the Judge yet in the transcript we read of an amount outstanding under the agreement.

As it would seem that this is just coming towards the Court, then surely we are dealing with an "alleged" sum outstanding, the agreement and its validity being brought under question because under the 1974 Consumer Credit Act an agreement to be an agreement has to be under certain criteria in law. It has not been decided yet whether this is an agreement in law or not.

Where was Mr Moran QC with his "Objection - Your Honour!"

(2) Part 2 gives a statement of a period of non-compliance.

It would seem from the case that there is a period of accepted "breach", the parameters set out however not allowing there to be consideration of reporting to CRA's during that period!

However, the behaviour of the Bank is lists in the area of the Bank's reporting to CRA's; the enforcement action of the Bank with defaulting, the threatening of legal action and the Bank's instruction to a third party.

(3) This relates as to whether the Claimant has any right to be protected by an injunction.

(4) This relates as to whether theCourt can grant an injunction to force the Bank to serve the signed statement of account as requited by Section 77(1) of the 1974 Act.

(5) This relates as to whether the Bank can continue reporting to CRA's.

(6) This relates to Unfair Trading Regulations.

(7) A reference to a letter from MJP Solicitors of 10 June 2009 as to whether it was a valid notice under section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998.

(8) This relates to the Banks and CRA's carrying information as passed on by the Bank in these circumstances.

(9) A very important point here relates to the failure of the Bank to inform the CRA of the full facts, unfair to the claimant within the meaning of section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act.

140AUnfair relationships between creditors and debtorsE+W+S+N.I.

(1)The court may make an order under section 140B in connection with a credit agreement if it determines that the relationship between the creditor and the debtor arising out of the agreement (or the agreement taken with any related agreement) is unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following—

(a)any of the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement;

(b)the way in which the creditor has exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related agreement;

(c)any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement).

(2)In deciding whether to make a determination under this section the court shall have regard to all matters it thinks relevant (including matters relating to the creditor and matters relating to the debtor).

(3)For the purposes of this section the court shall (except to the extent that it is not appropriate to do so) treat anything done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, an associate or a former associate of the creditor as if done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, or in relation to, the creditor.

(4)A determination may be made under this section in relation to a relationship notwithstanding that the relationship may have ended.

(5)An order under section 140B shall not be made in connection with a credit agreement which is an exempt agreement by virtue of section 16(6C).]

It is our view that in a dispute both sides should have opportunity to give their view to an outside agency like a CRA.

Point 24 relates to the following points (in part 3) relating to provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 as oulined by the McGuffick case.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 3

to European Law and the European Court of Justice.

Presented by Rev David P Griffiths

Clergyman of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath

was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and

will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?"
King and Queen, "All this I promise to do."
After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand

upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

"The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God."
Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book. IV. And be it enacted, That the said oath shall be in like manner administered to every King and Queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of this Realm, at their respective coronations, by one of the archbishops or bishops of this Realm of England, for the time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective coronations; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

Rev. David P Griffiths hereby uses his right as an Ordained Clergy man of the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law" to ensure the laws of God are maintained in the nation, to truly profess the true Gospel and the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law."

The Provisions of the Consumer Credit Acts

(as outlined in the Mc Guffick Case)

Point 25 of the case outline the provisions of the act that fall for consideration in this case.

Form and Content of Agreements

60 Form and content of agreements.E+W+S+N.I.

(1)The Secretary of State shall make regulations as to the form and content of documents embodying regulated agreements, and the regulations shall contain such provisions as appear to him appropriate with a view to ensuring that the debtor or hirer is made aware of—

(a)the rights and duties conferred or imposed on him by the agreement,

(b)the amount and rate of the total charge for credit (in the case of a consumer credit agreement),

(c)the protection and remedies available to him under this Act, and

(d)any other matters which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, it is desirable for him to know about in connection with the agreement.

What is interesting in this case is that only Part 1 of Section 60 has been brought towards the Court for consideration.

We bring the rest of section 60 for our consideration as a "Protestant Reformed" Ministry established by law in our Constitution.

(2)Regulations under subsection (1) may in particular—

(a)require specified information to be included in the prescribed manner in documents, and other specified material to be excluded;

(b)contain requirements to ensure that specified information is clearly brought to the attention of the debtor or hirer, and that one part of a document is not given insufficient or excessive prominence compared with another.

This is very important to the case as it would seem Royal Bank of Scotland were unable to do this, specified information it would seem by the Royal Bank's own admission they were unable to supply.

In our specific cases with Barclaycard the witness from MSB Solicitors is that Barclaycard was not able to comply.

(3)If, on an application made to the [F1] by a person carrying on a consumer credit business or a consumer hire business, it appears to the [F1OFT] impracticable for the applicant to comply with any requirement of regulations under subsection (1) in a particular case, [F2it] may, by notice to the applicant direct that the requirement be waived or varied in relation to such agreements, and subject to such conditions (if any), as [F2it] may specify, and this Act and the regulations shall have effect accordingly.

The Office of Fair Trading clearly has a role to see fair play.

(4)The [F1OFT] shall give a notice under subsection (3) only if [F2it] is satisfied that to do so would not prejudice the interests of debtors or hirers.

Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 60(3)(4) substituted (1.4.2003) by Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40), ss. 278, 279, Sch. 25 para. 6(23); S.I. 2003/766, art. 2, Sch. (with art. 3)F2Words in s. 60(3)(4) substituted (1.4.2003) by Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40), ss. 278,279, Sch. 25 para. 6(23); S.I. 2003/766, art. 2, Sch. (with art. 3)

Signing of Agreement

61 Signing of agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless—

(b)the document embodies all the terms of the agreement, other than implied terms, and

(c)the document is, when presented or sent to the debtor or hirer for signature, in such a state that all its terms are readily legible.

How could McGuffick's solicitors give opinion on the documentation if the Royal Bank of Scotland did not provide the information in the prescribed time?

Again - only Part 1 of Section 61 was presented in the transcript possibly understandably here due to the context of Section 58. We nevertheless present the rest of the section to put the section in context:

(2)In addition, where the agreement is one to which section 58(1) applies, it is not properly executed unless—

(a)the requirements of section 58(1) were complied with, and

(b)the unexecuted agreement was sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer [F1by an appropriate method] not less than seven days after a copy of it was given to him under section 58(1), and

(d)no notice of withdrawal by the debtor or hirer was received by the creditor or owner before the sending of the unexecuted agreement.

(3)In subsection (2)(c), “the consideration period ” means the period beginning with the giving of the copy under section 58(1) and ending—

(a)at the expiry of seven days after the day on which the unexecuted agreement is sent, for his signature, to the debtor or hirer, or

(b)on its return by the debtor or hirer after signature by him,

whichever first occurs.

Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 61(2)(b) substituted (31.12.2004) by The Consumer Credit Act 1974 (Electronic Communications) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/3236), art. 2(2)

Section 58(1) is cited in the section which relates to land mortgage rather than the unsecured situation we have with McGuffick.

Consequences of Improper Execution

Consequences of improper execution. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)An improperly-executed regulated agreement is enforceable against the debtor or hirer on an order of the court only.

(2)A retaking of goods or land to which a regulated agreement relates is an enforcement of the agreement.

The Court however to be a Court has to be operating under the fact that the Crest of H.M. The Queen representing all her oaths and the context that foreign law has to be suppressed is in place.

We believe that we can show this has not been the case with the McGuffick hearing.

Statements to be Provided in relation to Fixed-Sum Credit Agreements

F177AStatements to be provided in relation to fixed-sum credit agreementsE+W+S+N.I.

[F2(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit must give the debtor statements under this section.

(1A)The statements must relate to consecutive periods.

(1B)The first such period must begin with either—

(a)the day on which the agreement is made, or

(b)the day the first movement occurs on the debtor's account with the creditor relating to the agreement.

(1C)No such period may exceed a year.

(1D)For the purposes of subsection (1C), a period of a year which expires on a non-working day may be regarded as expiring on the next working day.

(1E)Each statement under this section must be given to the debtor before the end of the period of thirty days beginning with the day after the end of the period to which the statement relates.]

(2)Regulations may make provision about the form and content of statements under this section.

(3)The debtor shall have no liability to pay any sum in connection with the preparation or the giving to him of a statement under this section.

(4)The creditor is not required to give the debtor any statement under this section once the following conditions are satisfied—

(a)that there is no sum payable under the agreement by the debtor; and

(b)that there is no sum which will or may become so payable.

(5)Subsection (6) applies if at a time before the conditions mentioned in subsection (4) are satisfied the creditor fails to give the debtor—

(a)a statement under this section within the period mentioned in subsection [F3(1E)] ; [F1or]

(b)

[F1such a statement within the period of one year beginning with the day after the day on which such a statement was last given to him.]

(6)Where this subsection applies in relation to a failure to give a statement under this section to the debtor—

(a)the creditor shall not be entitled to enforce the agreement during the period of non-compliance;

(b)the debtor shall have no liability to pay any sum of interest to the extent calculated by reference to the period of non-compliance or to any part of it; and

(c)the debtor shall have no liability to pay any default sum which (apart from this paragraph)—

(i)would have become payable during the period of non-compliance; or

(ii)would have become payable after the end of that period in connection with a breach of the agreement which occurs during that period (whether or not the breach continues after the end of that period).

(7)In this section ‘the period of non-compliance’ means, in relation to a failure to give a statement under this section to the debtor, the period which—

(a)begins immediately after the end of the period mentioned in F4. . . subsection (5); and

(b)ends at the end of the day on which the statement is given to the debtor or on which the conditions mentioned in subsection (4) are satisfied, whichever is earlier.

(8)This section does not apply in relation to a non-commercial agreement or to a small agreement.]

Amendments (Textual)F2S. 77A(1)-(1E) substituted for s. 77A(1) (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(a) (with art. 5)F3Words in s. 77A(5) substituted (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(b)(i) (with art. 5)F1S. 77A(5)(b) and preceding word ceased to have effect (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(b)(ii) (with art. 5)F4Words in s. 77A(7) omitted (31.10.2008) by virtue of The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826), art. 4(c) (with art. 5)F1S. 77A inserted (16.6.2006 for certain purposes and otherwise 1.10.2008) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. {6}, 71(2) (with Sch. 3 para. 2); S.I. 2006/1508, art. 3(1), Sch. 1; S.I. 2007/3300, art. 3(3), Sch. 3Modifications etc. (not altering text)C1S. 77A modified (31.10.2008) by The Legislative Reform (Consumer Credit) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/2826) {art. 5}

The Act here shows the administrative demands in relation to agreements. Interesting that only Section 77A was brought to the attention of the Court in this hearing. Surely main section 77 should have been considered to place Section 77a into context.

77 Duty to give information to debtor under fixed-sum credit agreement. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and payment of a fee of [F1£1], shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer,—

Section 77 is crucial in this case because

It would seem from this case that it was accepted by Royal Bank of Scotland that they were unable to give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement within the prescribed period yet whilst accepting the inability seemingly ran enforcement action again McGuffick!

In our case with Barclaycard it is witnessed by MSB Solicitors that Barclaycard could not comply.

(a)the total sum paid under the agreement by the debtor;

(b)the total sum which has become payable under the agreement by the debtor but remains unpaid, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date when each became due; and

(c)the total sum which is to become payable under the agreement by the debtor, and the various amounts comprised in that total sum, with the date, or mode of determining the date, when each becomes due.

(3)Subsection (1) does not apply to—

(a)an agreement under which no sum is, or will or may become, payable by the debtor, or

(b)a request made less than one month after a previous request under that subsection relating to the same agreement was complied with.

(4)If the creditor under an agreement fails to comply with subsection (1)—

(a)he is not entitled, while the default continues, to enforce the agreement; F2. . .

(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Interesting how in this case it would seem Section 77 is not presented here for it seems to be clear Royal Bank of Scotland could not produce the required documents in the prescribed period yet even without the documents seems to have black-listed McGuffick with the Credit Reference Agencies thus reducing he and his household to trade!

Can we be sure that the late documents are genuine - but whether they are or not - the prescribed period seems to have lapsed!

(5)This section does not apply to a non-commercial agreement.

Amendments (Textual)F1"£1" substituted (1.5.1998) in s. 77(1) by S.I. 1998/997, art. 3,Sch.F2S. 77(4)(b) and preceding word repealed (26.5.2008) by The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/1277) regs. 30(1)(3), Sch. 2 para. 19, {Sch. 4 Pt. 1} (with savings in reg. 28(2)(3))

Ineffective Securities

106 Ineffective securities.E+W+S+N.I.

Where, under any provision of this Act, this section is applied to any security provided in relation to a regulated agreement, then, subject to section 177 (saving for registered charges)—

(a)the security, so far as it is so provided, shall be treated as never having effect;

(b)any property lodged with the creditor or owner solely for the purposes of the security as so provided shall be returned by him forthwith;

(c)the creditor or owner shall take any necessary action to remove or cancel an entry in any register, so far as the entry relates to the security as so provided; and

(d)any amount received by the creditor or owner on realisation of the security shall, so far as it is referable to the agreement, be repaid to the surety.

Act Not to be Evaded by Use of Security

113 Act not to be evaded by use of security.E+W+S+N.I.

(1)Where a security is provided in relation to an actual or prospective regulated agreement, the security shall not be enforced so as to benefit the creditor or owner, directly or indirectly, to an extent greater (whether as respects the amount of any payment or the time or manner of its being made) than would be the case if the security were not provided and any obligations of the debtor or hirer, or his relative, under or in relation to the agreement were carried out to the extent (if any) to which they would be enforced under this Act.

(2)In accordance with subsection (1), where a regulated agreement is enforceable on an order of the court or the [F1] only, any security provided in relation to the agreement is enforceable (so far as provided in relation to the agreement) where such an order has been made in relation to the agreement, but not otherwise.

(3)Where—

(a)a regulated agreement is cancelled under section 69(1) or becomes subject to section 69(2), or

(b)a regulated agreement is terminated under section 91, or

(c)in relation to any agreement an application for an order under section 40(2), 65(1), 124(1) or 149(2) is dismissed (except on technical grounds only), or

(d)a declaration is made by the court under section 142(1) (refusal of enforcement order) as respects any regulated agreement,

section 106 shall apply to any security provided in relation to the agreement.

The following part of Section 113 was not placed

before the Court for consideration

(4)Where subsection (3)(d) applies and the declaration relates to a part only of the regulated agreement, section 106 shall apply to the security only so far as it concerns that part.

(5)In the case of a cancelled agreement, the duty imposed on the debtor or hirer by section 71 or 72 shall not be enforceable before the creditor or owner has discharged any duty imposed on him by section 106 (as applied by subsection (3)(a)).

(6)If the security is provided in relation to a prospective agreement or transaction, the security shall be enforceable in relation to the agreement or transaction only after the time (if any) when the agreement is made; and until that time the person providing the security shall be entitled, by notice to the creditor or owner, to require that section 106 shall thereupon apply to the security.

(7)Where an indemnity [F2or guarantee] is given in a case where the debtor or hirer is a minor, or [F3an indemnity is given in a case where he] is otherwise not of full capacity, the reference in subsection (1) to the extent to which his obligations would be enforced shall be read in relation to the indemnity [F2or guarantee] as a reference to the extent to which [F4they][F4those obligations] would be enforced if he were of full capacity.

(8)Subsections (1) to (3) also apply where a security is provided in relation to an actual or prospective linked transaction, and in that case—

(a)references to the agreement shall be read as references to the linked transaction, and

(b)references to the creditor or owner shall be read as references to any person (other than the debtor or hirer, or his relative) who is a party, or prospective party, to the linked transaction.

Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 113(2) substituted (1.4.2003) by Enterprise Act 2002 (c. 40), ss. 278, 279, Sch. 25 para. 6(27); S.I. 2003/766, art. 2, Sch. (with art. 3)F2Words inserted (E.W.N.I.) by virtue of (E.W.) Minors' Contracts Act 1987 (c. 13, SIF 30), s. 4(1)(a)and (N.I.) S.I. 1988/930 (N.I. 9), art. 6(1)(a)F3Words inserted (E.W.N.I.) by virtue of (E.W.) Minors' Contracts Act 1987 (c. 13, SIF 30), s. 4(1)(b) and (N.I.) S.I. 1988/930 (N.I. 9), art. 6(1)(b)F4Words “those obligations ” substituted (E.W.N.I.) for “they ” by virtue of (E.W.) Minors' Contracts Act 1987 (c. 13, SIF 30), s. 4(1)(c) and (N.I.) S.I. 1988/930 (N.I. 9), art. 6(1)(c)

Enforcement Orders in Case of Infringement

We have given the full section here whereas the Court was only presented with part (1) (a) and Part 3 which seems to have been repealed by the Consumer Credit Act of 2006 which seems to have come into law on 6th April 2007.

Part 3 read as follows:

The court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65 (1) if section 61 (1) (a) (signing of agreements) was not complied with ...

It would seem from the evidence that this was a pre 06 April 2007 case.

127 Enforcement orders in cases of infringement. E+W+S+N.I.

(1)In the case of an application for an enforcement order under—

(a)section 65(1) (improperly executed agreements), or

(b)section 105(7)(a) or (b) (improperly executed security instruments), or

(c)section 111(2) (failure to serve copy of notice on surety), or

(d)section 124(1) or (2) (taking of negotiable instrument in contravention of section 123),

the court shall dismiss the application if, but F1. . . only if, it considers it just to do so having regard to—

(i)prejudice caused to any person by the contravention in question, and the degree of culpability for it; and

(ii)the powers conferred on the court by subsection (2) and sections 135 and 136.

(2)If it appears to the court just to do so, it may in an enforcement order reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or hirer, or any surety, so as to compensate him for prejudice suffered as a result of the contravention in question.

(3)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Annotations: Annotations are used to give authority for changes and other effects on the legislation you are viewing and to convey editorial information. They appear at the foot of the relevant provision or under the associated heading. Annotations are categorised by annotation type, such as F-notes for textual amendments and I-notes for commencement information (a full list can be found in the Editorial Practice Guide). Each annotation is identified by a sequential reference number. For F-notes, M-notes and X-notes, the number also appears in bold superscript at the relevant location in the text. All annotations contain links to the affecting legislation.
Amendments (Textual)F1Words in s. 127(1) repealed (6.4.2007) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. 70, 71(2), Sch. 4 (with Sch. 3 para. 11); S.I. 2007/123, art. 3(2), Sch. 2F2S. 127(3)-(5) repealed (6.4.2007) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. {15}, 70, 71(2), {Sch. 4} (with Sch. 3 para. 11); S.I. 2007/123, art. 3(2), Sch. 2

Unfair Relationships Between Creditors and Debtors

[140AUnfair relationships between creditors and debtorsE+W+S+N.I.

(a)any of the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement;

(b)the way in which the creditor has exercised or enforced any of his rights under the agreement or any related agreement;

(c)any other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor (either before or after the making of the agreement or any related agreement).

The following was not presented to the Court, and we would argue that point 4 here could well be relevant because how can there be a relationship when one side takes penal action without the relevant documentation against the other.

(4)A determination may be made under this section in relation to a relationship notwithstanding that the relationship may have ended.

(5)An order under section 140B shall not be made in connection with a credit agreement which is an exempt agreement by virtue of section 16(6C).]

Powers of Court in Relation to Unfair Relationships

140BPowers of court in relation to unfair relationshipsE+W+S+N.I.

(1)An order under this section in connection with a credit agreement may do one or more of the following—

(a)require the creditor, or any associate or former associate of his, to repay (in whole or in part) any sum paid by the debtor or by a surety by virtue of the agreement or any related agreement (whether paid to the creditor, the associate or the former associate or to any other person);

(b)require the creditor, or any associate or former associate of his, to do or not to do (or to cease doing) anything specified in the order in connection with the agreement or any related agreement;

(c)reduce or discharge any sum payable by the debtor or by a surety by virtue of the agreement or any related agreement;

(d)direct the return to a surety of any property provided by him for the purposes of a security;

(e)otherwise set aside (in whole or in part) any duty imposed on the debtor or on a surety by virtue of the agreement or any related agreement;

(f)alter the terms of the agreement or of any related agreement;

(g)direct accounts to be taken, or (in Scotland) an accounting to be made, between any persons.

It is important to realise the extent of debt over the last twenty years in our society, the weighting of many agreements being towards the banking institutions who have in our view followed mammon rather than be servants of the people - as the old time Bank Manager was to a community.

However what is really interesting here is the part of 140 B not presented to the Court:

(2)An order under this section may be made in connection with a credit agreement only—

(a)on an application made by the debtor or by a surety;

Remembering this was an apparent "test case", this section not being presented in this McGuffick case, but surely by this case removing many cases from the system prevents who is described as "the debtor" making an application under law that is not even being presented in this case!

(b)at the instance of the debtor or a surety in any proceedings in any court to which the debtor and the creditor are parties, being proceedings to enforce the agreement or any related agreement; or

(c)at the instance of the debtor or a surety in any other proceedings in any court where the amount paid or payable under the agreement or any related agreement is relevant.

(3)An order under this section may be made notwithstanding that its effect is to place on the creditor, or any associate or former associate of his, a burden in respect of an advantage enjoyed by another person.

(4)An application under subsection (2)(a) may only be made—

(a)in England and Wales, to the county court;

(b)in Scotland, to the sheriff court;

(c)in Northern Ireland, to the High Court (subject to subsection (6)).

(5)In Scotland such an application may be made in the sheriff court for the district in which the debtor or surety resides or carries on business.

(6)In Northern Ireland such an application may be made to the county court if the credit agreement is an agreement under which the creditor provides the debtor with—

(a)fixed-sum credit not exceeding £15,000; or

(b)running-account credit on which the credit limit does not exceed £15,000.

(7)Without prejudice to any provision which may be made by rules of court made in relation to county courts in Northern Ireland, such rules may provide that an application made by virtue of subsection (6) may be made in the county court for the division in which the debtor or surety resides or carries on business.

(8)A party to any proceedings mentioned in subsection (2) shall be entitled, in accordance with rules of court, to have any person who might be the subject of an order under this section made a party to the proceedings.

(9)If, in any such proceedings, the debtor or a surety alleges that the relationship between the creditor and the debtor is unfair to the debtor, it is for the creditor to prove to the contrary.]]

Amendments (Textual)F2S. 140B inserted (6.4.2007) by Consumer Credit Act 2006 (c. 14), ss. {20}, 71(2) (with Sch. 3 paras. 14, 16); S.I. 2007/123, art. 3(2), Sch. 2

Power to Declare Rights of Parties

142 Power to declare rights of parties.E+W+S+N.I.

(1)Where under any provision of this Act a thing can be done by a creditor or owner on an enforcement order only, and either—

(a)the court dismisses (except on technical grounds only) an application for an enforcement order, or

(b)where no such application has been made or such an application has been dismissed on technical grounds only, an interested party applies to the court for a declaration under this subsection,

the court may if it thinks just make a declaration that the creditor or owner is not entitled to do that thing, and thereafter no application for an enforcement order in respect of it shall be entertained.

The following not presented to the Court

(2)Where—

(a)a regulated agreement or linked transaction is cancelled under section 69(1), or becomes subject to section 69(2), or

(b)a regulated agreement is terminated under section 91,

and an interested party applies to the court for a declaration under this subsection, the court may make a declaration to that effect.

We have seen from this presentation the part of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act presented to the Court, there being however great relevance in parts of the 1974 Act that were not presented.

The Claimant most certainly seemed to have the law on his side with the apparent admission of Royal Bank of Scotland that they had not produced documentation within the prescribed period, this section seemingly missing from Court consideration at this stage:

(1)The creditor under a regulated agreement for fixed-sum credit, within the prescribed period after receiving a request in writing to that effect from the debtor and payment of a fee of [F1£1], shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement (if any) and of any other document referred to in it, together with a statement signed by or on behalf of the creditor showing, according to the information to which it is practicable for him to refer,—

Section 77 is crucial in this case because

Our belief from the hearing is that it is clear that Royal Bank of Scotland could not keep to the requirements of the Act which is just one breach! There is a far worse one in our view and that is in their own enforcement action against McGuffick whilst not holding the necessary documentation to back it!

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 4

Presented by Rev. . David P Griffiths

Clergyman of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath

was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and

upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

"The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God."

The McGuffick Case: Notification to Credit Reference Agencies

Point 26 intimates that the Bank provides information to three CRA's in U.K.: Callcredit PLC, Equifax Europe Ltd and Experian Limited. These are all licensed by the Office of Fair Trading defined by Section 145(8) of the 1974 Act.

145 (8)A credit reference agency is a person carrying on a business comprising the furnishing of persons with information relevant to the financial standing of individuals, being information collected by the agency for that purpose.

Point 27 identifies the actual mechanics of all of this. An important principle of the operation of this called "The Governing Principle" is outlined.

Data are shared only for the prevention of over-commitment, bad debt, fraud, and money laundering, and to support debt recovery and debtor tracing, with the aim of promoting responsible lending.

Mr Moran speaking for the Claimant seems to question therefore the use of CRA's as being a tool for enforcement. In other words the Bank could threaten (before a hearing in this case) that if you do not do what we say the default would be reported to the CRA.

This is what we are boldly declaring as completely and absolutely unconstitutional. The Bank it would seem in this case was threatening this before the matter had reached court and seemingly before they had provided the documentation. Absolutely UNFAIR WE SAY and what we see as the operations of Corpus Juris - GUILTY WITH A RECORD BEFORE A HEARING.

If the principle of a man being innocent before a hearing was being applied(Habeas Corpus) then no reference would have been made to the CRA!

Point 28 gives Mr Moran really emphasizing this point of CRA recording.

Point 29 shows the adeverse consequences for the debtor and his "associates" - other members of his household as shown in the letter from the Bank of 15th. May 2007 - in the form of adverse credit showing for a period of six years. This can impair employment prospects in certain Government Departments or the Police who can access credit data on a person for the purposes of employment vetting.

In the cases we are outlining on this site that even though we were in dispute with Banks - they could play the big hand and reduces our employment and trading opportunities for a period of six years unless we did what they said before a hearing.

We did not bow to this wicked form of demand which we see as BLACKMAIL before a hearing and we will go on and on and on and on till these ludicrous references are removed and substantial compensation paid for blackening our name, not only to banking institutions but also to potential future employers.

THE FIGHT IS ON not only for us but also for CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE! The fight however we know will not be won but has already been won because JESUS defeated mammon 2000 years ago and WE PROCLAIM THIS VICTORY TODAY IN OUR NATION CONSTITUTIONALLY because the Jesus of Calvary is the GOD of our constitutional acts.

Point 30 shows in our view a back off by Mr Moran in his statement that he was not suggesting that the Bank had behaved in an unscrupulous manner.

We believe the evidence is to the contrary.

Point 31 shows Mr Handyside for the Bank showing their apparent innocence when its comes to keeping to the Governing Principle.

We ask and ask this emphaticaly: Is it keeping to the Governing Principle defaulting a customer whose account is in dispute awaiting a hearing. Even in a criminal court the defendant is innocent before being found guilty and being given a criminal record.

Here the Bank was threatening in our view Mr McGuffick's ability to trade or get employment if he did not bow to the Bank which in our view was operating as an Egpytian Pharoah holding its slave without the slave having the right to give his side of the story. UNCONSTITUTIONAL we say!

Point 32 relates to Mr Handyside taking about the fitness of a person to hold a licence and we intend to report all this to the Office of Fair Trading.

We believe the whole scenario here was grossly unfair against Mr. McGuffick and intend to show this in our own cases.

Point 33 relates to lending decisions under certain criteria.

Point 34 gives Mr Handyside stating that the reporting to CRA's was not a coercive tool in the hands of the bank.

We disagree because of the impact it has on the person's ability to trade and gain employment, the reporting in these cases going on during periods of dispute. WE DECLARE THE PRACTICE ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the threats clearly issued by banks to get their own way even before liability is established.

In Point 35 relates to other members of the family being effected is seemingly denied by Mr Handyside unless the issue relates to a joint account or joint application for credit.

The main point is the adverse information of the person in dispute with the Bank. This we present as unfair and if it can be proved that other members of the household in any case have been affected, then we believe legal action should be taken against the institution that has affected the life of an innocent individual.

Point 36 relates to a denial from Royal Bank of Scotlkand that it had used the threat of reporting Mr McGuffick's refusal to pay (when in dispute we would argue) to CRA's.

We argue that in the cases with Barclaycard that we have experienced the phenomena of a case being in dispute and Barclaycard threatening us, that unless we do what they say they will default us thus preventing us from trading.

Is this right, moral and legal before a court hearing? We say this phenomenon is highly illegal!

If CRA's are there as a means of allowing responsible lending, then how is it they are apparently being use as a threatening tool by banking institutions?

Whether non-compliance with Section 77(1) extinguishes the bank's rights

Point 37 shows the claimant's counsel Mr Moran giving three propositions in support of the case that it was not open for the Bank to report to CRA's during the period of unenforceability.

It is a mystery to us why these propositions were necessary. In our view the Bank was not able to provide the necessary documentation in the prescribed time, and during this time we believe the Bank was guilty of giving a "criminal record" equivalent without the evidence to back it up and without a court hearing to back it up.

WE say the same for Barclaycard.

This seemingly was brought up by Mr Moran in Proposition 1.

The understanding of what is meant by "enforceable" is outlined in Proposition 2 whilst Proposition 3 relates to a "default" which clearly enforces an agreement which is unenforceable by the terms of the 1974 Act.

All this in our view is ridiculous and more importantly unconstitutional. A court hearing was on the way, a clear dispute was continuing and Royal Bank of Scotland illegally in our view reported to CRA's. Guilty before being found guilty is the state of affairs here in our view!

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 5

to European Law and the European Court of Justice.

Presented by Rev. David P Griffiths

Clergyman of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath

was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and

upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

Rev. . David P Griffiths hereby uses his right as an Ordained Clergy man of the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law" to ensure the laws of God are maintained in the nation, to truly profess the true Gospel and the "Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law."

The McGuffick Case: Reference to Other Cases

It seems to be common in legal cases to refer to similar hearings.

This is reported in Points 38 to 85.

Case 1: Wilson v First County Trust Limited (No2)

This seems to refer to the principles of a House of Lords edict presented by Mr Moran for the claimant! Mr Moran declared that the result of this hearing supports the claimant's case but this was challenged by Mr Handyside for the Bank saying the result supports the Bank's case!

A Mrs Wilson before the County Court had claimed the loan agreement with First County was unenforceable under the 1974 Act demanding the return of her car which had been given in security. A £250 "document fee" had been added to the loan and at first instance the Judge had founded that the document had been part of the agreement thus making the agreement enforceable.

Mrs Wilson on apparently losing the case did not give up! Mrs Wilson appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard in November 2000 and here we have the first reference in the case to European law for Point 40 declares this occurred shortly after the Human Rights Act had come into force. The Court of Appeal held that the document fee was not part of the credit, one of the prescribed terms in the agreement being incorrectly stated, contrary to section 61(1)(a) of the 1974 Act thus making the agreement unenforceable, the car being returned to Mrs Wilson who retained the amount of the loan and the car paying no interest charges.

Point 41 however gives a further reference to the Court of Appeal with Sir Andrew Morritt VC expressing concern at the outcome considering that it might be arguable that section 127(3) of the Act infringed Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

We see this statement as treasonable to the degree of placing European Law above British Law. Since when has there been the starred flag of Europe above Judge's seats. The last time I saw a Judge's seat the crest of H.M. the Queen was above it! Hallelujah! The Crest that shows a nation is still under Christian Constitutional Acts that demand the Monarch (the Judge is the Monarch's representative) suppress foreign infiltrations into our legal processes.

1534 Act of Supremacy brought back into law by Queen Elizabeth I

The obligations of this act are as follows:

1) Increase in virtue (anointing) of Christ’s Religion. This means being bound to Christ, the present turning away from the real Christ Jesus of the Reformation being completely and absolutely unconstitutional.

2) Repress and extirpate all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses. The extreme heresy of our National “Church” today has to be repressed.

3) The Monarch to act in the line of repressing the extremities that are religiously affecting the nation. This is extremely serious in the context of today for we are seeing a complete breakdown of all that is precious to us.

4) To conserve the peace, unity and tranquillity of the realm. Come on! Lets make a stand for we have become a very divided nation with our apparent membership of the E.U. This has brought in Roman Catholics from all over Europe who will vote in a Roman Catholic agenda in our nation which is why the Church of England of which the Monarch is the head on earth must take its stand and take over control of our nation in a Protestant way.

5) To repress the infiltration of foreign laws and systems into our nation.Roman countries use the principles of Corpus Juris that have their origins in Babylon whereas our Protestant system of Habeas Corpus has its origins in Jerusalem, Greece and Protestant Britain. It is obvious to see that the activities of Rome Henry suppressed are coming back. Rome is taking away our freedoms and so those in Christian Ministry today must demand by quoting this act of Supremacy that our Monarch repress as she is obligated to do these infiltrations into our society.

Our nation still has a Christian Constitutional Monarch, we are still a Theocracy under God, we still have Christian Constitutional Acts. Foreign infiltration into our legal processes still have to be suppressed with The Monarch's crest above the Judge. We are witnessing foreign infiltration here.

We say illegal, unconstitutional and treasonable.

Whilst keeping the ancient landmark our father have established in our nation, we would like to ask an additional question?

Was the referendum to apparently join Europe a vote for a trading union or a political and legal union?

We rest our case on this one!

The system has not rested however and in Point 41 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry was brought in and after an adjournment the Court of Appeal gave judgment concluding that 127 (3) in so far as it prevents the court from making an enforcement order, is incompatible with article 6(1) of the Convention and with article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.

So what we are learning from this is that when a case is won under British law, European law (which the Monarch has to suppress) takes precedence over the British act.

This whole incredible issue that has come into this McGuffick case show the Secretary of State appealing to the House of Lords in Point 42. Trade associations and insurance companies were also represented. Before their Lordships, the primary argument for the government was that the Court had no right to make a declaration of incompatibility!

Thank God - in Point 43 the Lords decided the Human Rights Act had no retrospective power but they did not find that for the future cases.

We say our constitutional acts apply for yesterday, today and forever!!!!!!!

Coming back to the actual McGuffick case,

Point 44 shows Mr Moran referring to the Lords judgment (Lord Nicholl's). In Point 45 Mr Moran submitted that where an agreement is improperly executed there is extinguished rights in relation to that loan!

Point 46 relates to Lord Nicholl's judgment (paragraph 49) that the 1974 Act renders the "entire agreement inoperative." Indeed Lord Nicholl's judgment in paragraph 72 refers to the lender "losing all his rights under the agreement."

Point 47 relates to the infiltration of European law into all of this, the Consumer Credit Act 1974 being incompatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol of European Human Rights legistlation.

H.M. The Queen is U.K. Head of State who has taken an oath before God that includes all the Constitutional Acts that surround it. She is obligated to suppress this, her representative being the Judge who has the Monarch's crest above his seat.

It would seem these legal matters were being won by the claimant under British law and lost under European law.

Point 48 has Mr Moran honing in on sections 65 and 127 of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act rather than the European distraction, the point relating to properly executed agreements.

Point 49 relates to the findings of Lord Hope of Craighead, section 65 of the 1974 Act being referred to over improperly executed agreements,European Convention rights not being applicable here, point 50 referring to restricted rights of the creditor rather than no rights at all.

Point 51 has Mr Handyside for the Bank challenging the notion that this case has authority for the notion of unenforceability in the McGuffick case.

This is very interesting for here it would seem that even though the McGuffick case has become a "test case", another test case which would seem to find for the claimant, Mr Handyside challenges.

Well if Mr Handyside can challenge the result of the claimant's test case, then we can challenge the result of the McGuffick case which seems to have resulted in thousands of cases being withdrawn from county courts!

Points 52 & 53 refers to Lord Nicholl's question of the creditor's right of security, Mr Handyside for the Bank in Point 54 states that section 127 of the 1974 Act does not deprive the agreement of all legal effect but the reality of it all is recognised in the point that the 1974 Act declared the Wilson agreement unenforceable.

Context is considered in Points 55 & 56 and the effects of European legistlation, another case (Coister Trust v John Hardman & Co 2008) coming into the fray.

Point 58 points out that the House of Lords was divided on the issue over the effect of British Law (section 127 of the 1974 Act) and article 1 of the First Protocol.

A simple reading of our constitutional acts would have solved that issue, The Monarch's oath to God being far higher than any politician's signature of giving away our heritage to Europe!

Point 59 continue on this point of British law v European law, point 60 showing Mr Handyside referring to the concept of as valid contract even if the contract is unenforceable!

We put forward that this is a very strange notion indeed!

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 6

Presented by Rev. David P Griffiths

Clergyman of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath

was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and

upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

Where We are At Now: the Legal Position

We stopped paying Barclaycard in the time leading up to court hearings, hearings that no longer seem to be taking place.

We question the ability of a lower court to wipe out hearings that came about as a result of an edict from the highest court in the land – the House of Lords.

We question the references to the European Court of Justice in the now well know McGuffick case which was presented to us as a test case apparently proving Barclaycard’s position against us. We believe the case actually proves the case for us – for disputes are legally recognised in the case – thus how can Barclaycard therefore take enforcement action against us when a court has recognised a dispute? We believe this to be Corpus Juris – illegal under British Constitutional Law.

We believe we can prove the illegality of this case as the position given to Protestant Clergymen by H.M. The Queen in her Coronation Oath clearly gives rights and privileges to ensure the Constitutional Acts of 1534, 1689 and 1700 as well as The Elizabethan Settlement is kept to. We do not believe this has occurred with the Mc Guffick Test Case and intend to challenge it even to the Highest Court in the Land – The House of Lords.

We do not believe it to be constitutionally right for a defendant to take enforcement action against a claimant before a hearing or do we believe it right to sell on private information to a third party so as to make money out of the claimant. We have received several phone calls from people we don’t know seemingly knowing our personal financial affairs intimately.

We do believe there have been treasonable actions taking place here, perverting The Course of Justice as well as complete disregard to previous cases that followed the House of Lords Edict, previous cases that include past clients of MSB Solicitors.

2) Introduction

There are a number of technical requirements listed relating back to the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and we employed MSB to check that our now alleged agreements met the demands of this order and the 1974 Consumer Credit Act. Considerable delay occurred in many cases in the banks returning information and it was clear that once Stage Two was reached that the likelihood of validity was unlikely - such was the wording of the House of Lords Order.

It is clear that the House of Lords Order resulted in a number of legal firms advertising a service that would wipe out debts without affecting credit rating – indeed enhancing them.

Our experience to date is that EMLG credit rating is showing defaults to stay on for 6 years unless the defaults can be taken away. We believe we have a strong case to fight back.

On 30 May 2009, however the Daily Mail reported that the Government had stepped in to stop this activity. However, the Lords had issued an Order and that Order is higher than Government Action as the House of Lords is the higher court. We believe our analysis shows reference to the European Court of Justice having influence in all this which we believe to be treasonable under British Constitutional Law.

At Manchester all the hearings seem to have been halted – but how can that be? The Lords had issued an Order!!!!!! How can a lower court reject a higher court’s order? To try and answer this we now present points from the McGuffick case that has been analysed here.

3) The McGuffick Case

Phillip McGUFFICK – Claimant and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Defendant before The Honourable Mr Justice Flaux

DISPUTE POINT PROVEN: Barclaycard had denied there being a dispute until much later in proceedings – thus giving them apparent legal rights to take enforcement actions against claimants. Immediately on Page 1 – there is a major error in the case. The report introduction relates the case as being one of a large number of cases in relation to disputes that had occurred between banks and debtors. The Court had recognised disputes here – disputes consistently denied in EMLG cases by banks. Since when in British law has there arisen a situation where one party can default another, affect their ability to trade over a disputed account awaiting a court hearing? We believe this to be global law (Corpus Juris) manifesting in our legal system. Throughout we have paid undisputed accounts – not disputed ones on their way to a hearing. We intend to take this all the way back to the Lords if necessary.

To help the Banks here & at the same time prove from the McGuffick case that R B of S took enforcement action against McGuffick during the time when they did not have signed papers and the account was “irredeemably unenforceable”:

All law has to be applied with “law and justice in mercy” and so if there is a delay in finding papers then it can be expected that both parties would discuss this together. We believe MSB Solicitors did this in our cases but still considered cases irredeemably unenforceable. Point 9 of the report covers action by the claimant (like ours) of not paying while the account was in dispute. It is noted that R B of S had received hundreds of requests from solicitors and claims management companies on behalf of clients for documents from the bank in relation to legal action.

1689 Act Establishing the Coronation Oath which deals with the application of law in Great Britain: Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to your power cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all your judgements?" King and Queen, "I will." We believe through MSB Solicitors we have offered this to the Banks – but have had enforcement actions against us whilst we were showing mercy.

Point 11 intimates the testimony of Clare Price of R B of S who stated that although it was the policy of the bank to keep all copies of loan agreements – it was not always possible to provide them in the prescribed period.

It is my recollection in our case that MSB informed us that when the prescribed period was over MSB reminded the bank of their obligations and seemingly did not act on the basis of not meeting the time period.

So why has the case been lost?

Point 14: R B of S after considerable delay finds signed agreement which seems to have made the agreement enforceable again under Section 77 (4) but during the time when the account was unenforceable – the Bank defaulted McGuffick. This seems to have been discussed in point 15. Point 17 places doubt by Mr Moran for the claimant that this was not a good test case & in this legal equation there seems to have been in this case a period when the agreement was unenforceable (when the collecting system went against him) and a period when it was enforceable. There was also the added complication of an insurance deal being active in the case which it is not in our cases.

The Point Over whether The Credit Deal and the Implications of the deal were properly set out to McGuffick: Point 18 brings to the fore the actual credit deal itself and whether the costs involved were properly set out, point 19 pointing out that in this case there seems to be an understanding of temporary unenforceability but surely it cannot be legal to act against the claimant with a default during the period of unenforceability. The technicalities of the claimant’s case are put forward in Point 19. There is a note in the transcript that the phrase “irredeemably unenforceable” was used by Lord Hoffman (see the link to the House of Lords) in Dimond v Lovell 2002. What is interesting is that a certain Mr. Flaux (an unusual name) was involved in a 2003 appeal that followed this case. Is this the same person as the judge in this case and what position did he take then? The Appeal case was one between Lagden and O’Connor.

Appeal Case between Lagden & O’Connor in which it would seem The Honourable Mr. Justice Flaux was involved. The Case related to a dispute between motor hire companies and motor insurers, the similarity between this case and ones that relate to credit agreements today is whether the demands of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act have been made. In the 2002 Case the agreement was found to be unenforceable – hence the beginning of the use of this phrase. Point 21: The main issue that had to be resolved in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384 was whether the form of agreement which had been used in that case satisfied the requirements of a regulated consumer credit agreement for the purposes of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. For reasons that it is not necessary to explain for the purposes of this case where the same difficulty does not arise, the agreement was held to be unenforceable. But one of the points that was argued was whether, even if the claim had been sound, the damages recoverable ought to be limited to the spot hire rate quoted by hirers other than credit hire companies.

In this case a Mr. Flaux took the wider view of the harm placed on the big insurance companies that would have an effect on premiums rather than the individual keeping to the law – this individual decision seemingly being under to the wider view of Mr. Flaux.39. The view of the majority in Dimond v Lovell was based on their analysis of the law, not on consideration of issues of policy. But Mr Flaux sought to invoke policy considerations in this case in order to support his argument that claims handing charges should not be recoverable under any circumstances. He submitted that, if there were to be a relaxation of the rule that claims handling charges were irrecoverable in the case of the cost of car hire, this would increase the burden of insurance premium payments on the whole community. There was also the prospect of claims handling charges being built into damages claims in other fields as well as that relating to car hire. He pointed out how important it was to distinguish between costs and damages in cases brought in the county court in view of the costs limits that are applied to cases under the small claims track. He submitted that, if the claimant were to be allowed to recover the full cost of the Helphire scheme, that would be tantamount to awarding him costs to which he would not otherwise be entitled. To allow the impecunious to recover claims handling charges as part of their claim of damages would encourage accident management companies to market and direct their services at those of limited means with results that would be undesirable.

Utilitarian Position of Mr. Flaux?: A clear view of Mr. Flaux’s perspective on life is shown here, that view clearly to me showing a bias towards the big company and the wider apparent good over the individual keeping of law under the 1974 Consumer Credit Act. This tells me if we are dealing with the same Mr. Flaux here that there is a philosophical bias in the judge based on past statements and actions.

It is my view that in the case McGuffick has become the scapegoat of taking the rap for the greater good in that his keeping of law has to be put aside for the greater good of banks ability to operate – something the Royal Bank of Scotland failed to do – they only being in existence because of taxpayers help.

Utilitarian Position of U.K. Government who remember are not the Head of State – H.M. The Queen is and the Obligations of Her Office that have been outlined in this report, it being rejected by us that we as claimants could be counted as swindlers!

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1189746/Government-leads-crackdown-debt-loophole-swindlers.html#ixzz0fbRv9rs5

By Dan Atkinson

Law enforcement agencies and Government officials are this weekend launching a crackdown on unscrupulous operators who have misled tens of thousands of consumers into believing they can walk away from their debts.

People struggling to pay off their liabilities are being fooled into thinking they can exploit a legal loophole to wipe the slate clean.

But after handing over £1,500 in fees to pursue a case through the county courts, the vast majority learn that they have not got a case and their legal action is dismissed.

So what we are saying then is being proven right for a deal was done in effect "criminalalising" claimants -

for the greater good!!!!!!

Utilitarianism triumphs over the Constitution!

Meeting: The FSA held a summit over the issue of unenforceable debt

Mounting concern has followed the rapid growth during the past year of an industry in which some claims managers suggest to those in financial difficulties that because of badly worded credit contracts their debts are likely to be unenforceable in law.

The manager takes a fee of up to £500 for his part in trying to annul the debts. The debtor must pay a further £1,000 or so to a solicitor, who in many cases then hands back hundreds of pounds to the manager as a 'referral fee'.

In some cases the wording of contracts falls foul of the law, but it is thought that the great majority of credit agreements are upheld by the courts.

It is believed that the courts face having to deal with 100,000 cases. The fees - worth £150million in total - are not refundable in most cases.

Police, the Financial Services Authority and the Ministry of Justice held a summit on these 'unenforceable consumer credit agreements' at FSA headquarters in London on Friday.

The meeting came as the spotlight swung from the 'claims management industry', which brings in the business, to the solicitors who take the cases to court.

Up to 12 law firms are thought to be under investigation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, with more likely to follow.

There have even been allegations that some claims have been auctioned among solicitors.

The civil courts have been swamped by the cases - usually relating to credit card debt.

The pressure that these actions has put on the courts has led at least one judge to freeze further hearings until the commercial court in London can lay down a legal precedent. And the banks are furious at having to devote expensive manpower to digging out old contracts that are the subject of dispute.

'There is a very significant workload,' said a banking source. 'You may have to go back decades to find an agreement form and all because of claims that are usually spurious.'

Eric Leenders, executive director of the British Bankers' Association, said: 'The law is not intended to provide loopholes.' Geoffrey Negus, of the SRA, said: 'Our advice to anyone with debt problems is to visit Citizens Advice, which is free, or go to your solicitor.'

Claims management firms deal with claims relating to injury, housing disrepair, employment, injuries and financial products. Most are entirely reputable.

Read more: http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/article-1189746/Government-leads-crackdown-debt-loophole-swindlers.html#ixzz1lvQDeG4Q

This Daily Mail article showed Government interference in these cases and so if we can prove this then we can show a Judge might well have been put into place to call for the “greater good” over individual keeping of law. It is clear after the bail out of the banks that if the thousands of cases had gone through giving the now scapegoats compensation and their now alleged debts written off – it could have bankrupted the banks again – involving a further bail out from the taxpayer thus placing the nation under greater debt. This is what I believe has happened in this case which is in my view grossly illegal for these activities clearly “pervert the cause of justice.” Is it worth “perverting the cause of justice” for the nation? I believe that this Mc Guffick case shows the answer to be “yes”! “Greater Good” seems to have taken precedence over justice.

This is Utilitarianism.

UtilitarianismFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article discusses utilitarian ethical theory. For a discussion of John Stuart Mill's book Utilitarianism, see Utilitarianism (book). For the architectural theory, seeUtilitarianism (architecture)

Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by itsutility in providing happiness or pleasure as summed among all sentient beings. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome.

Utilitarianism is often described by the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number of people", and is also known as "the greatest happiness principle". Utility, the good to be maximized, has been defined by various thinkers as happiness or pleasure (versus suffering or pain), although preference utilitarians define it as the satisfaction of preferences. It may be described as a life stance, with happiness or pleasure being ofultimate importance.

Utilitarianism can be characterised as a quantitative and reductionist approach to ethics. It can be contrasted with deontological ethics (which do not regard the consequences of an act as being a determinant of its moral worth) and virtue ethics (which focuses oncharacter), as well as with other varieties of consequentialism.

In general usage, the term utilitarian (Katrin Joost) refers to a somewhat narrow economic or pragmatic viewpoint. Philosophical utilitarianism, however, is a much broader view that encompasses all aspects of people's lives. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism

Back to the case McGuffick v Royal Bank of Scotland: in point 20 – the Judge is invited to give guidance in relation to the lender’s refusal to meet the requirements of Section 77(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. In Point 21 we read Mr Richard Handyside QC urging the court not to embark on such rulings or guidance – this being an inappropriate test case it would seem. There seems to be no disagreement in the case that the Bank had not kept to the terms of Section 77(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 – yet the Judge founded against the Claimant – we believe because of his utilitarian rather than Constitutional stance.

Similar Activity Against McGuffick as we have had to endure: The activity of the Bank R B of S against McGuffick seem to be similar to the actions against EMLG which relate to contractual obligation to pay, the reporting to credit reference agencies during the time of dispute, claimants personal data being given to a third party which we suspect has happened to EMLG due to the large amount of calls from debt management companies, the demands to pay, the issuing of default notices, the threatening of legal action, the instructing to a third party to demand payment.

We argue – how can any of this be possible during a dispute on its way to court for had EMLG paid during the dispute – she would have been pre-empting the Court’s decision – and breaking the principles of British Constitutional Law?

Other factors in relation to the activities of McGufficks solicitors came into the equation too – including the signing of agreements etc., consequences of improper execution, fixed sum credit agreements, ineffective securities, enforcement orders, unfair relationships (we regard it grossly unfair that during the time of dispute – disputes recognised by both this court and Barclaycard that creditors should take enforcement action before the court has passed judgment).

The Role of Credit Reference Agencies who seemingly have processed adverse information on behalf of defendent banks during times of Dispute leading up to Court Hearings: Under Points 26 to 36 the Court heard of information that is sent to Credit Reference agencies. We regard the activity highly illegal in times of dispute – for since when has it been part of British law for one side to adversely affect the ability of the other side to trade?

Under British Constitutional law in times of dispute it would be seen customary for both sides to give their side on the record or await a court hearing. A person with a clean criminal record facing a Crown Court hearing would retain his good character until the moment a jury finds him guilty and the Judge has pronounced the verdict – why should EMLG therefore have a credit criminal record before the Court Hearing?

This is an example of Corpus Juris under which legal system a person has to prove his/her innocence which is happening in this case. This is highly treasonable as there is constitutional demand on the Monarch to repress all foreign infiltration into our legal systems.

Where we are now with all this and information on Utilitarianism follows:

THE HOUSE OF LORDS and UTILITARIANISM

Part 7

to European Law and the European Court of Justice.

Presented by Rev. David P Griffiths

Clergyman of the Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law

1689 Act that Established the Coronation Oath

was sworn by Her Majesty the Queen at her Coronation in June 1953.

Archbishop or bishop, "Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and

will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?"

King and Queen, "All this I promise to do."
After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand

upon the holy Gospels, shall say, King and Queen,

The Forbidding of Foreign Influence into our legal processes particularly in view of reference to the European Court of Justice in the McGuffick Case.

The 1534 Act of Supremacy (still an overriding constitutional requirement thanks to Queen Elizabeth I restoring the Act) strictly forbids foreign influence.

Proof:

1534 ACT OF SUPREMACY. Albeit the king’s Majesty justly and rightfully is and ought to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is recognized by the clergy of this realm in their convocations, yet nevertheless, for corroboration and confirmation thereof, and for increase of virtue in Christ’s religion within this realm of England, and to repress and extirpate all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses heretofore used in the same, be it enacted, by authority of this present Parliament, that the king, our sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall be taken, accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England, called Anglicans Ecclesia; and shall have and enjoy, annexed and united to the imperial crown of this realm, as well the title and style thereof, as all honors, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and commodities to the said dignity of the supreme head of the same Church belonging and appertaining; and that our said sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall have full power and authority from time to time to visit, repress, redress, record, order, correct, restrain, and amend all such errors, heresies, abuses, offenses, contempts and enormities, whatsoever they be, which by any manner of spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be reformed, repressed, ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained, or amended, most to the pleasure of Almighty God, the increase of virtue in Christ’s religion, and for the conservation of the peace, unity, and tranquillity of this realm; any usage, foreign land, foreign authority, prescription, or any other thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding. http://www.britainexpress.com/History/tudor/supremacy-henry-text.htm

Queen Elizabeth I re-emphasised the point in what became known as her settlement.

Proof is in the Oath of the Settlement:

I, A. B., do utterly testify and declare in my conscience that the Queen’s Highness is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other her Highness’s dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm; and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queen’s Highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, pre-eminences, privileges and authorities granted or belonging to the Queen’s Highness, her heirs or successors, or united or annexed to the imperial crown of this realm. So help me God, and by the contents of this Book.

The Act of the Settlement itself began with this very important point:

An acte restoring to the crown the ancient jurisdiction over the state ecclesiastical and spiritual and abolishing all foreign power repugnant to the same.

The Coronation Oath of our present Monarch (established under the 1689 Act) goes along the same theme.

Proof:

III. The archbishop of bishop shall say, “Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this Kingdom of England, and the dominions thereto belonging, according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the same?”
The King and Queen shall say, “I solemnly promise so to do.”
Archbishop or bishop, “Will you to your power cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all your judgements?”
King and Queen, “I will.”
Archbishop or bishop, “Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the Protestant reformed religion established by law, and will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this Realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?”
King and Queen, “All this I promise to do.”
After this, the King and Queen laying his and her hand upon the holy Gospels, shall say,
King and Queen, “The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: So help me God.”
Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book. IV. And be it enacted, That the said oath shall be in like manner administered to every King and Queen, who shall succeed to the imperial crown of this Realm, at their respective coronations, by one of the archbishops or bishops of this Realm of England, for the time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective coronations; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is a legal fact that our Constitutional laws are higher than global legal processes and even actions by the U.K. Government. It is also a fact that clergymen of the Protestant Reformed Religion have been given rights to ensure they are kept to – these rights being for the benefit of everyone including Roman Catholics, Muslims,Hindus – whoever – as the Protestant Reformed Religion established by law is one of love towards one’s neighbour– not of oppression.

The laws and customs mentioned in the Oath are of course linked to the Constitutional Acts of 1534, Elizabeth I, the 1700 Act of Settlement as well as this 1689 Act Establishing the Coronation Oath. They are well above global banking systems that in our view are under Corpus Juris and are high above what we see as the Epicurean stance of the Judge, the philosophy coming out of this judgment clearly being utilitarian.

Further Analysis of the Utilitarian stance: This philosophy was embraced by Epicurus and extended by Jeremy Bentham who viewed pain and pleasure as the ruling values of the World. From this he produced the rule of utility which we believe Mr Justice Flaux has acted upon in giving a decision (despite of law being to the contrary) of the greatest good for the vast majority of people. With all the thousands of cases in the system awaiting debt write-offs and compensations and legal fees to be paid – if he had founded by law it could well have placed banks awaiting a further government bail –out – that bail – out resulting in greater financial strain on the taxpayer and so we believe Mr Justice Flaux has founded for the “greater good”!

Other Cases brought up in the Hearing & Mr Justice Flaux reference to European Law: The effect of other cases were considered by Mr Justice Flaux in points 38 to 93 in which various interpretations were given from previous cases including interpretation of the House of Lords edict in points 69 -70 but what is more alarming under British law is the reference to European law (Corpus Juris) and the European Court of Justice in points 94-97. There is also a reference to “member states” but it has to be remembered that the Head of the Legal system in Britain is H.M. The Queen. It is her crest that would have been above the Judge – not the crest of the European Union in which Britain has no constitutional membership (remember the referendum to join was into a Common Trading Union – not a political and legal union.

Have the Constitutional Principles been applied in this case by Mr. Justice Flaux or has there been foreign influences over our Legal Processes?Remember the Elizabethan Settlement which our present Monarch is still under as is Mr Justice Flaux who is the Queen’s representative in court. Interesting that within the constitutional acts clergymen are given rights to ensure they are kept to. As a clergyman I will be ensuring they are and that the clear Edict of the House of Lords is kept to.

I, A. B., do utterly testify and declare in my conscience that the Queen's Highness is the only supreme governor of this realm, and of all other her Highness's dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm; and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queen's Highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, pre-eminences, privileges and authorities granted or belonging to the Queen's Highness, her heirs or successors, or united or annexed to the imperial crown of this realm. So help me God, and by the contents of this Book.

Data Protection Act: In Points 106 to 116 the Data Protection Act is intimated, we in the Griffiths family wanting to know how it is we get phone calls from various parts of the World seeming to know all about our apparent financial circumstances. We strongly suspect our private information has been sold onto other agencies and as it is our information – we would like the proceeds of this criminal activity.

Poor Mr. McGuffick?: It is not surprising Mr. Justice Flaux in Point 118 rejected poor Mr. McGuffick’s claim which in our view he needs to return to a court properly operating under the Constitutional Acts of Great Britain.

Rich Mr. McGuffick can be grateful to the fact that H.M. The Queen cannot sign away to Europe what she swore before God in her Coronation Oath of 1953 in which clergymen are given powers to ensure that these Constitutional Principles of this Oath, the Act of Supremacy of 1534, the Elizabethan Settlement and the 1700 Act of Settlement are kept to. H.M. the Queen and what she has sworn along with the Constitutional Obligation of the stated acts are overruling acts over the influences of global legal systems and the U.K. Government.

Suggested Way Forward: There is clearly obligation on the Nation to repent before God for allowing a situation like this one to occur. A nation can work together again as long as it adheres to its landmark. The bowing down to Europe and attempts to combine British legal protocol with Corpus Juris is causing havoc to us all.

The Outstanding Barclaycard Invoice from 2012

09 July 2012

For the bearer of this letter, there has been years of frustration, disappointment; while the banks have combined fear with bullying tactics, not only against myself, but the people of Britain who have entrusted their savings, borrowings & other business to you in all good faith.

What would my father, a London banker in the early 1930s, have said about such commandeering of people’s hard-earned savings & pensions? What would he have said about the manipulation, control & apparently legalised money-laundering, false accusations, slander, misrepresentation of the truth, all carried out under the name of “banking practice”?

What would he have said about the demise of small business, about the fear & mistrust, if not downright hatred, sown into the lives of the British public by the banking institutions?

“High time this was stopped!” he would have said. And it has been stopped. We the customers have said “Enough!” We are calling you to account. It is pay-back time.

For defaulting me, for threatening me either by post or consistent aggressive phone calls (Barclaycard); for threatening to blacken my credit file while I was taking Barclaycard to court; for use of scamming techniques to try and get me to pay on 2 disputed accounts I now demand the sum of £250,000 compensation; a complete removal of all adverse comment on my credit file and a complete stop to harassing me for now alleged accounts that were on the way to Court but strangely removed – we believe for the reasons we have shown.

Letter to Barclaycard 2013 & questions they will not answer!

For a long time the Griffiths family endured constant harassment from Barclaycard and its agencies. In our fight for justice this letter was written in 2013 after years of battle:

Barclaycard
PO Box 10200
Wigston
LE18 9ER

Dear Sir or Madam,

Re. Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths

Your Reporting of Unbalanced Financial Information about me to Credit Reference Agencies including Experian, the following being a copy of a letter being sent to them about your behaviour in recognising a dispute but still defaulting me. This has made it difficult for me to trade normally despite of the fact that all undisputed accounts have been fully paid off including one disputed one by error!

COPY OF LETTER TO EXPERIAN with Barclaycard References:

It has been one of the great traditions of our country that in a dispute both sides should have their say. It is also one of the great traditions of our country that when a case is on its way to court, then one awaits the decision of that court in relation to a matter. It is also one of the great traditions of our country that when one is awaiting a court hearing one does not harass the opponent, default the claimant as I was in these cases before a court hearing. It is also one of the great traditions of our country that government does not interfere with edicts of the Upper House which we believe has happened here. It is also one of the great traditions of our country that foreign philosophies, references and adherences does not influence our legal processes and this letter categorically proves in this case that they have contrary to the law of our nation.

Where does that leave Experian? I believe that the contents of this letter will prove in a very difficult position which we are happy to work through with you but please understand we are not going to accept the unconstitutional position I have found myself in isolated by your company and I assume other credit reference agencies.

The Story:

It goes back to 2008 when I employed Consumer Credit Solicitors MSB Solicitors Joanna Connolly and Sam Audley, MSB House, 20-22 Tapton Way, Wavertree Business Village, Liverpool L13 1DA.

They looked at each and every one of our credit agreements which were fully paid up to date. At that time there was great emphasis being placed in the consumer marketplace that to be “enforceable” then strict criteria had to be met in line with the 1974 Consumer Credit Act. They advised as to which banks were meeting the criteria set by the House of Lords edict and the 1974 Consumer Credit Acts.

From our accounts we divided those in dispute and those not in dispute using the criteria that those in dispute must await the court hearing before continuing to pay. We put to you that what we went through by bank who were in dispute with can only be described as “hell on earth”, the “cease and desist” notices of MSB Solicitors being ignored by offending banks to appalling consequences on I and my family.

I live under the philosophy of paying undisputed accounts on time but when an account is in dispute I firmly know that the disputed account must await the court hearing particularly as I was the claimant! To default and harass a claimant is illegal, unconstitutional and appalling behaviour as you will see from the detailed case notes to follow.

It is my view that I was subject to mafia style tactics similar to those used to intimidate and bully witnesses featured in the Chicago movies of the 1930’s, in this case the violence being against my resolve and reputation.

(This particularly relates to Barclaycard and its operations under a different name, Mercers and Calder whilst the dispute was on its way to court.)

The Cases:

1) Barclaycard that was Morgan Stanley and Goldfish = 5301 2710 1411 1001. MSB Solicitors Case No. JC/SA/48744.008. This was considered UNENFORCEABLE by MSB Solicitors, Liverpool on 28. April, 2009. Considerable harassment came to my family and I with harassing phone calls demanding payment whist the matter was awaiting a court hearing. This harassment came through two apparent debt collecting agencies called Mercers and Calders – the calls from whom were very aggressive. Our study on these agencies led us to believe that these two named agencies were part of Barclays and we pointed out at the time that this being the case Barclays were PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE by harassing a claimant at that time taking the matter to court.

The crucial point here that another agency to whom they passed on the account Debt Managers Ltd admitted a dispute, our argument being that payments or non – payments occurs when a dispute is settled which remains the case.

MSB Solicitors intimated to us that a positive outcome had occurred after a Case Management Conference in Manchester.

On 28. April 2009 I received a notice from MSB Solicitors that they considered the accountUNENFORCEABLE by virtue of Section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act and/or Section 78/77 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

We went through processes of payment demands and on the 26. July 2009 a default notice, illegal in the context of these events was served through Mercers and on the 28. July 2009 I sent a notice to Mercers not recognising the “default” which we do not do to this day and if the ”default” is to remain on my credit file then I insist that my side of the story be placed on the file – that is only fair.

Calders then became involved and on 28. July we asked the question whether their legal actions were of European Corpus Juris or British Habeas Corpus, the latter meaning that one is innocent before a court hearing, Juris meaning entirely the opposite so here is an example of foreign practice in this case; illegal under the 1534 Act of Supremacy re-established in the Elizabethan Settlement 1559.

Mercers then threatened they would send local debt collectors to our house when we were communicating, trying to negotiate whilst under great pressure because at the time we were looking after two special needs people in this house, the impact of debt collection visits being something that caused serious stress.

Various “underarm” tactics took place with the use of “social stationery” rather than business stationery followed by a notice from Calder in 29 10 09 threatening summons, baliffs, taking money out of wages, local collector and adverse credit ratings none of which happened except with you the adverse credit rating it would seem! All this when I was the claimant taking Barclaycard to court!!!!!!!!!!

At the same time we were getting word through MSB Solicitors that an outcome to all this looked very positive legally and so the saga continued.

Debt Managers of Edinburgh got involved on 23 12 09 with a formal demand and so on 01 01 10 I gave them this story and the constitutional demand we live by. Debt Managers replied with threat of court action (difficult when we were the claimant on the way to court at the time) court costs and again the adverse credit rating which they all seem to have been successful with – with you!!!!!!!!

On 06 01 10 we were told by Debt Managers that they were closing the file and returning the now alleged account to Barclaycard.

On 01 02 10 I then received a phone call from Apex Credit chasing the account but on being told this saga they too returned the now alleged account to Barclaycard.

On 12 03 10 we received intimation from MSB Solicitors in relation to their emphasis in the case of section 78 of the Consumer Credit act 1974 but then we receive word on 08 04 10 that even though our case had not come to court I had become liable according to the High Court, a detailed study of the very strange McGuffick “test case” following which I present through the work of my husband as completely unconstitutional and illegal.

2) Barclaycard 4929 4705 6295 7006. MSB Solicitors Case No. JC/SA/48744.002. This is a long running saga which I take from 10. October 2008. On 10 10 08 I received a letter from MSB Solicitors considering unenforceability virtue of Section 127(3) Consumer Credit Act 1974.

On 03 12 08 I was informed by Solicitor Joanna Connolly that Barclaycard had been informed that the agreement is “irredeemably unenforceable” a definite statement rather than an opinion.

On 20 01 09 I received a letter from Colin Sefton, Legal Regulatory Compliance of Barclaycard seemingly arguing with the edict of Joanna Connolly. Now the point of me mentioning this is very clear. If an professional solicitor has issued an edict on an company – then the company argues back – then one has a dispute but instead of accepting this awaiting the court hearing Barclaycard went on a campaign of aggression and abuse against me and my family. This included defaulting admidst all the harassment and abuse.

At the time Barclaycard were simply adding onto the alleged amount owing with Colin Sefton denying there was a dispute!!!!!!!! On 15 02 09 a letter was received by Barclaycard threatening to wop my previously perfect credit file which they now seem to have done with your company Experian as a means to black list my name! This makes you as an accessory to the crime!!!!!! Following this I was informed by MSB Solicitors saying the papers on this case had been sent to Counsel.

Following on 26 02 09 Barclaycard wrote to me stating they were sorry to hear of my dissatisfaction aiming to resolve matters by 19. March 2009. I am still waiting!!!!!!!

On 14 03 09 I issued a serious harassment complaint to Barclaycard saying that family life had been affected by a barrage of phone calls. A letter from Barclaycard Customer Relationship Unit was received stating that they aimed now to resolve the complaint by 20 04 09 and again I am still waiting.

On 19 03 09 my husband informed MSB Solicitors by E Mail of the serious Barclaycard harassment. I followed with a further complaint to Barclaycard on 20 03 09. A reply from a Candice Skelton, Customer Relationship Manager of Barclaycard was received. This referred to my request to stop the harassing phone calls on a claimant on the way to court at that time! She stated that I was aware that my account had become overdue for payment. I was not aware because the now alleged account was on its way to court and in dispute. I was referred to one of their agents, professional debt counselling service, CAB or the Consumer Credit Counselling Service but the refusal to pay had nothing to do with inability to pay at the time, but everything to do with my constitutional right to not pay a disputed account on its way to court.

On 21 03 09 I wrote a letter to Ms Dineen, Colin Sefton of Barclaycard and to Joanna Connolly and Sam Audley of MSB Solicitors with a plea to find a sensible way forward without the continuous Barclaycard harassment but all I received back was standard rather than specific letters from Barclaycard that addressed the serious matters in hand.

On 25 03 09 I emphasized the need for sensible dialogue rather than the considerable harassment that I believe Barclaycard today owe us compensation for. I mentioned the position of Habeas Corpus in legal matters to a reply that Barclaycard had to give factual information to Credit Reference Agenciesand I am proving here that they have not! In a dispute I am legally entitled to give our side to the agencies which in your case I am doing now but under the harassment we came under it seems on your credit file you are only giving one side in a dispute. Does this mean you are biased towards the banks or will you either remove the adverse comments or allow me to give my side?

On 01 04 10 I wrote a further letter to Ms Dineen and Colin Sefton of Barclaycard complaining of standard reply letters rather than specific ones addressing the issues over which my family had to endure great harassment. I issued a notice on Barclaycard stating my belief that they were acting treasonably as they had conducted themselves under illegal global law systems rather than our own British Law.

What followed on 05 04 09 was a Default Notice by Mercers who seem to be owned by Barclaycard this in my view being guilty of perverting the course of justice by changing identity before a court hearing. The alleged account balance was rising!!!!!!!

On 06 04 09 I wrote to Mercers referring them to MSB Solicitors of Liverpool and then on 07 04 09 I wrote to Ann Vivemar and Karen Conman of Mercers stating their “default notice” was not recognised but seemingly it has been by you!

On 14 04 09 a reply was received from Robert Wallace of Barclaycard denying involvement in harassment or criminal activity but my perspective is that Barclaycard had broken the Harassment Act of 1997, perverted the course of justice and acted treasonably by not recognising a dispute which at the time was on its way to court.

On 16 04 09 I relied to Robert Wallace stating that all my payments were up to date until the beginning of the dispute.

On 20 04 09 Elaine Mockler sent a letter with Barclaycard Terms and Conditions which of course are under the relevant House of Lords edict relating to the 1974 Consumer Credit Act.

On 21 04 09 Mercers issued a notice threatening to send a local debt collector to our door! On 22 04 09 I wrote to Mr Dave Clark of Mercers confirming our referring to our solicitors MSB of Liverpool. On 23 04 09 I issued a warning to Mercers saying the legal requirement that when a case is on its way to court the term “alleged” should be used!

On 23 04 09 Robert Wallace denied harassment and criminal activity by Barclaycard, Candice Skelton of Barclaycard having apologised on 30 03 09 saying sorry we remained dissatisfied telling us we had six months to contact the Financial Ombudsman Service which we have since found out have no brief to consider these matters of dispute!!!!!!!

On 01 05 09 MSB Solicitors wrote to Mercers warning of an official complaint being issued to the Office of Fair Trading and other relevant authorities under Section 40 Administration of Justice Act 1970 and Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Strong words but the harassment continued with MSB Solicitors simply issuing a threat but not taking action when the threat was ignored.

On 01 05 09 the harassment continued with a threat by Mercers of sending a local debt collector turning up at our home to collect full payment! On 07 05 09 the Barclaycard Public Relations Team stated they aimed to resolve matters by 29 05 09, a further letter of 15 05 09 saying they aim to resolve matters by 05 06 09. I still await this resolving!!!!!!!!!!!

On 26 05 09 Phil Clark put Barclaycard’s side in a letter followed on 27 05 09 with Frances Chambers putting her version for Barclaycard! This is all showing there was and is a dispute!

On 04 06 09 Mercers issued a “48 hour notice” with an ever expanding balance of monies owing adding to the balance during a dispute.

On 04 06 09 I wrote to MSB Solicitors (who had issued a legal threat to Barclaycard) stating that severe harassment from both Barclaycard and Mercers had occurred during a time of legal action and a dispute. I had become ill at this time with the strain and Doctor’s visits occurred. I asked MSB Solicitors to consider a complaint to the Office of Fair Trading which they had threatened. I reminded MSB Solicitors of their quoted Administration of Justice Act 1970 and I also expressed the view to them that Barclaycard had broken criminal law in the context of the Harassment act of 1997.

I wrote a further letter to MSB Solicitors on 13 06 09 intimating a use by Barclaycard of European legal systems prohibited in the 1534 Act of Supremacy. It seemed that no action was taken by MSB Solicitors leaving us at the mercy of this powerful bank.

On 16 06 09 the first intimation from Power 2 Contact of Crewe (looks like another Barclays company) stating that they were a “finding agency”! After showing the 1534 Act of Supremacy to MSB Solicitors I wrote to Power 2 Contact referring them to MSB Solicitors who issued a Cease and Desist notice on Power to Contact!

On 26 09 09 I wrote to MSB Solicitors saying I was seriously considering taking Barclays to the then DPP reminding Ms Dineen of Barclaycard on 29 06 09 that there would be absolutely no payments whilst account was in dispute. My husband put a series of questions to Barclaycard:

Bearing in mind it is well known in departments of Barclaycard and MSB that we are in process of taking Barclaycard to court .......

· Do you believe it is legal for one party to hound another whilst a case is on its way to court?

· Do you believe it is legal for one party to describe itself under another name whilst a court hearing is on the way as it was at this time? (Mercers and Calder are seemingly owned by Barclays so when MSB sent a Cease and desist letter to one – the alleged account was passed to another.)

· Do you believe it is legal to ignore solicitors’ letters asking you to contact them rather than harass us?

· Do you believe it is right to threaten home visits by collectors when a case is on its way to a court hearing?

· During the time the matter was on its way to a court hearing – do you think it is right to refer to a balance in notices – rather than an “alleged” balance?

· During the time the matter was on its way to a court hearing – do you think it is right to “default” EMLG?

· In amongst all this activity – do you think it is right for us to negotiate with people who have behaved in what we would call an unconstitutional way?

On 29 06 13 intimation was received from MSB Solicitors that Counsel had agreed to act on a “no win – no fee” basis but court fees had to be paid which MSB did return with cheques that I did not cash because we never backed out due to our finding of foreign and what we believe is illegal government interference in the course of justice at the time. Proof follows later in this letter.

On 05 07 09 Calder now comes on the scene with an ever increasing alleged amount owing! Their threats included summons costs but again I was the claimant first! Other threats included increasing the harassment and so it went on!

On 08 07 09 I put to MSB Solicitors the change of identity whilst a court case was pending case thus perverting the course of justice. On the same day I wrote to Colin Rogers of Calder who have the same address as Mercers thus surely proving the identity change. On the same day I receive a letter from Barclaycard Public Relations Team saying they were sorry to hear of my dissatisfaction and that they aimed to resolve matters by 28 July 2009. Again I am still waiting!

On 14 07 09 I received a letter from Frances Chambers of Barclaycard relating to section 78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and then we had an admission by Stacey Shaw of Barclaycard admitting for the first time a dispute between us! How can I be defaulted therefore when Barclays admit a dispute! You cannot default a disputed account and now the dispute is uncontested! How can you harass a claimant during a uncontested dispute?

On 01 08 09 my husband wrote to Sam Audley of MSB Solicitors pointing out Barclaycard’s acceptance of a dispute! Despite of this on 02 08 09 Calder demanded a sum £1,751-48 higher than the beginning of the now uncontested dispute! I trust you are now getting my point over the illegal “default” against my name here!

From 12 08 09 new harassments begin this time from a new agency called RMA of Preston. Threats of sending debt collectors and CCJ’s was in their barrage of threat! On 18 08 09 I wrote to Joanna Connolly and Sam Audley of MSB Solicitors pointing out again illegal behaviour by Barclaycard but this firm of solicitors seemed to be all threat and no action. I wrote to RMA referring them to MSB Solicitors of Liverpool. On 25 08 09 I wrote to Sam Audley of MSB Solicitors informing her of RMA harassment. On 02 09 09 RMA stated that Barclaycard had accepted a settlement figure of £12,728-50, a figure that had grown by £1,751-48 since the start of the now uncontested dispute. On 08 09 09 RMA stated that they cannot help us unless we speak to them. I think we have proven with all the phone calls and letters, and E Mails that a lot of speaking and writing had already taken place.

On 09 09 09 MSB Solicitors informed me that my claim against Barclaycard had been issued at Liverpool County Court and on the same day I informed RMA to stop harassing me and here I present evidence of harassment with the case now issued at court! It is my view strange events which are presented later were going on behind the scenes with these cases for just two days after MSB Solicitors issued at Liverpool a transfer notice was issued to transfer the case to Manchester under His Honour Judge Waksman.

On 12 09 09 my husband replied to MSB Solicitors pointing out that we had respected the House of Lords ruling and by doing so endured merciless harassment, come under treasonable activity, acts of perverting the course of justice and failure to keep MSB Solicitors Cease and Desist edicts.

On 22 09 09 despite of the case being issued in court RMA looked for a payment arrangement! Despite of admitting a dispute on 28 09 09 Stacey Shaw of Barclaycard stated we should carry on paying, odd I felt in Britain! On 28 09 09 I again referred RMA to MSB Solicitors who issued a notice on 29 09 09 stating I had failed to keep the agreed payment plan! What agreed payment plan? I pointed this out in my return letter of 06 10 09, Jon Huckfield of RMA replying to say the account was on hold!!!!!!!

Joanna Connolly of MSB Solicitors writes on 16 10 09 thanking me for Barclaycard correspondence requesting I continue to send the information, Stacey Shaw of Barclaycard writing on 06 11 09 saying she has nothing further to add and so no correspondence occurred between 06 11 09 and 18 01 10.

On 18 01 10 Joanna Connolly states that our claim was listed for a hearing on 2. February 2010 but due to a ruling by His Honour Judge Waksman my claim had been removed. My husband researched the background to this amazing change of course in this case and believes he has found background that is not legal to this amazing change of course, a change completely at odds with a House of Lords ruling. Report follows.

On 16 06 10 Apex Credit Management Ltd looked for payments from me, a threat of 28 06 10 occurring of a “home visit appointment.” On the same day Apex issued a notice that our information had been passed onto Barclaycard and that the account was on hold! We then on the same day heard from Josh Lorento of Apex that the account was closed on their systems.

In July 2010 another agency turned up called Wescot saying I could send further information and this went on through July and August with a letter of 14 09 10 from Barclaycard saying they had informed Wescot to proceed with formal recovery but on the 15 09 10 Wescot replied in effect saying they had backed out!

I wrote to Barclaycard on 29 09 10 seeking relationship and I have no record of reply. In February and August of 2012 I wrote to Barclaycard with an invoice for compensation, a letter, log of events and my husband’s research on the Mc Guffick “test case” which follows in this letter to you. I sent a House of Lords information letter to Barclaycard on 09 02 12; a Logs letter on the same date; a reminder letter on 09 07 12 and a further reminder letter on 08 08 12 all without reply. The harassment has gone but the smearing of my name continues now under your banner. I ask for this smearing to be removed or at the very least allow me to present my side of events on now unbalanced information advertised by you affecting my ability to trade, despite of being completely up to date on undisputed accounts!

3) Barclaycard: 4929 4231 0571 7007. MSB Solicitors Case No. JC/GW 48744.006. On 18 11 08 this account was found UNENFORCEABLE but the Barclaycard was mixed up in our system and treated as enforceable so it was paid off although Barclaycard have prevented use of the card.

4) Awaiting Stage 2 notification. MSB Solicitors passed no judgment on this Barclaycard and so it has been paid off.

i) Barclaycard Platinum 4929 4260 4134 5007

Our Legal Position and the McGuffick “Test Case”

Where We are At Now: the Legal Position

We stopped paying disputed accounts at the time leading up to court hearings, hearings that no longer seem to be taking place.

We question the ability of a lower court to wipe out hearings that came about as a result of an edict from the highest court in the land – the House of Lords.

We question the references to the European Court of Justice in the now well know McGuffick case which was presented to us particularly by MBNA as a test case apparently proving their position against us. We believe the case actually proves the case for us – for disputes are legally recognised in the case – thus how can these banking institutions now marginalised by British Society take enforcement action against us when a court has recognised a dispute? We believe this to be Corpus Juris – illegal under British Constitutional Law.

We believe we can prove the illegality of this case as the position given to Protestant Clergymen by H.M. The Queen in her Coronation Oath clearly gives rights and privileges to ensure the Constitutional Acts of 1534, 1689 and 1700 as well as The Elizabethan Settlement be kept to. We do not believe this has occurred with the Mc Guffick Test Case and intend to challenge it even to the Highest Court in the Land – The House of Lords.

You will have noticed my issuing of constitutional breaches now despite of being called “archaic” and not relevant to our account by DLC – they actually all relate to the Monarch’s Oath to God which is highly relevant in everything!

The obligations of this act that was re-instated by Queen Elizabeth I in 1559 are as follows:

2) Repress and extirpate all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses.

4) To conserve the peace, unity and tranquillity of the realm.

5) To repress the infiltration of foreign laws and systems into our nation. Roman countries use the principles of Corpus Juris that have their origins in Babylon whereas our Protestant system of Habeas Corpus has its origins in Jerusalem, Greece and Protestant Britain. Foreign law is taking away our freedoms and so those in Christian Ministry today must demand by quoting this act of Supremacy that our Monarch repress as she is obligated to do these infiltrations into our society.

This is the oath of the present Monarch’s Coronation in 1953. It has to be adhered to, there being very serious consequences for anyone who should have persuaded the Monarch to behave in a way contrary to her oath.

Here are the demands of the Oath:

* Maintain the statutes, laws and customs of the realm. We believe the banks we have presented to you have not

* Government of the People is the Monarch’s responsibility according to the statutes of Parliament and the laws and customs of the same. We believe the complete ignoring of the House of Lord edict relating to the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 was unconstitutional and treasonable.

* Law and justice in mercy to be executed in all judgements.

* The Laws of God maintained, the Monarch being obligated to do this by the utmost of her power meaning she is honour bound not to allow laws onto the statute book that contravene the Word of God, any such law being null and void according to this constitutional demand.

v The utmost of the Monarch’s power has to be used in relation to the on-going profession of the Gospel and the Protestant Reformed Religion that has been established by law.

* Rights and privileges are given by law to Bishops and clergy meaning in reality whom we see as being unconstitutional we have every right to expose and bring situations back to British law which we are doing here.

In this context we do not believe it to be constitutionally right for a defendant to take enforcement action against a claimant before a hearing or do we believe it right to sell on private information to a third party so as to make money out of the claimant. We have received several phone calls from people we don’t know seemingly knowing our personal financial affairs intimately.

We do believe there have been treasonable actions taking place here, perverting the Course of Justice as well as complete disregard to previous cases that followed the House of Lords Edict, previous cases that include past clients of MSB Solicitors.

Introduction

There are a number of technical requirements listed relating back to the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and we employed MSB Solicitors to check that our now alleged agreements met the demands of this order and the 1974 Consumer Credit Act.

Considerable delay occurred in many cases in the banks returning information and it was clear that once Stage Two was reached that the likelihood of validity was unlikely - such was the wording of the House of Lords Order.

It is clear that the House of Lords Order resulted in a number of legal firms advertising a service that would wipe out debts without affecting credit rating – indeed enhancing them.

Our experience to date is that EMLG credit rating is showing defaults to stay on for 6 years unless the default can be taken away. We believe we have a strong case to fight back.

MBNA seem to have been very confident of victory, their Vice President intimating to me a great victory for RBofS in the MsGuffick case, the Judge there passing other cases to Manchester. At Manchester all the hearings seem to have been halted – but how can that be? The Lords had issued an Order!!!!!! How can a lower court reject a higher court’s order? To try and answer this we now present points from the McGuffick case that has been analysed here.

The McGuffick Case

Phillip McGUFFICK – Claimant and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Defendant before The Honourable Mr Justice Flaux

DISPUTE POINT PROVEN: Consistently banks had denied there being a dispute– thus giving them apparent legal rights to take enforcement actions against us the Claimant.

Immediately on Page 1 of the McGuffick case – there is a major error in the case. The report introduction relates the case as being one of a large number of cases in relation to disputes that had occurred between banks and debtors. The Court had recognised disputes here – disputes consistently denied in EMLG case by the banks except Barclaycard who admitted a dispute yet still carried on with enforcement action.

Since when in British law has there arisen a situation where one party can default another, affect their ability to trade over a disputed account awaiting a court hearing? We believe this to be global law (Corpus Juris) manifesting in our legal system. Throughout we have paid undisputed accounts – not disputed ones on their way to a hearing. We intend to take this all the way back to the Lords if necessary.

Banks seemed to have defaulted EMLG at the same time as in the McGuffick case that R B of S took enforcement action against McGuffick during the time when they did not have signed papers and the account was “irredeemably unenforceable”:

Point 9 of the report covers action by the claimant (like ours) of not paying while the account was in dispute. It is noted that R B of S had received hundreds of requests from solicitors and claims management companies on behalf of clients for documents from the bank in relation to legal action.

Point 12: It seems R B of S were looking for the agreement when they defaulted the account. Surely the account should have been on hold in this time of dispute instead of going for McGuffick! Point 13: R B of S admitted that they had not issued a signed copy of the agreement during the time period and still defaulted the account! It is admitted that this signed agreement was required by Section 77 (1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. So why has the case been lost? Point 14: R B of S after considerable delay finds signed agreement which seems to have made the agreement enforceable again under Section 77 (4) but during the time when the account was unenforceable – the Bank defaulted McGuffick. This seems to have been discussed in point 15. Point 17 places doubt by Mr Moran for the claimant that this was not a good test case & in this legal equation there seems to have been in this case a period when the agreement was unenforceable (when the collecting system went against him) and a period when it was enforceable. There was also the added complication of an insurance deal being active in the case which it is not in our cases.

The Point Over whether The Credit Deal and the Implications of the deal were properly set out to McGuffick: Point 18 brings to the fore the actual credit deal itself and whether the costs involved were properly set out, point 19 pointing out that in this case there seems to be an understanding of temporary unenforceability but surely it cannot be legal to act against the claimant with a default during the period of unenforceability. The technicalities of the claimant’s case are put forward in Point 19. There is a note in the transcript that the phrase “irredeemably unenforceable” was used by Lord Hoffman (see the link to the House of Lords) in Dimond v Lovell 2002. What is interesting is that a certain Mr. Flaux (an unusual name) was involved in a 2003 appeal that followed this case. Is this the same person as the Judge in this case and what position did he take then? The Appeal case was one between Lagden and O’Connor.

Utilitarian Position of U.K. Government who remember are not the Head of State – H.M. The Queen is and the Obligations of Her Office that have been outlined in this report:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1189746/Government-leads-crackdown-debt-loophole-swindlers.html#ixzz0fbRv9rs5

It is clear after the bail out of the banks that if the thousands of cases had gone through giving the now scapegoats compensation and their now alleged debts written off – it could have bankrupted the banks again – involving a further bail out from the taxpayer thus placing the nation under greater debt.

This is what I believe has happened in this case which is in my view grossly illegal for these activities clearly “pervert the cause of justice.” Is it worth “perverting the cause of justice” for the nation? I believe that this Mc Guffick case shows the answer to be “yes”! “Greater Good” seems to have taken precedence over justice.

This is Utilitarianism.

UtilitarianismFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article discusses utilitarian ethical theory. For a discussion of John Stuart Mill's bookUtilitarianism, see Utilitarianism (book). For the architectural theory, see Utilitarianism (architecture)

Other factors in relation to the activities of McGuffick’s solicitors came into the equation too – including the signing of agreements etc., consequences of improper execution, fixed sum credit agreements, ineffective securities, enforcement orders, unfair relationships (we regard it grossly unfair that during the time of dispute – disputes recognised by this court that creditors should take enforcement action before the court has passed judgment).

The Role of Credit Reference Agencies who seemingly have processed adverse information on behalf of defendant banks during times of Dispute leading up to Court Hearings: Under Points 26 to 36 the Court heard of information that is sent to Credit Reference agencies.

We regard the activity highly illegal in times of dispute – for since when has it been part of British law for one side to adversely affect the ability of the other side to trade?

Following is my husband’s full report on the McGuffick “Test-Case”:

You can read this by CLICKING HERE

Not surprisingly Barclays responded negatively -

not much interested it would seem in being a

"Constitution Keeper"!

In response to Barclay's Negative Reply:

Kelly Stewart

Barclaycard

Customer Relationship Unit

P.O. Box 5402

NORTHAMPTON

NN4 1ZR

Dear Kelly Stewart,

Re. Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths

Your Reference: A0689770

Thank you for your reply dated 12. December 2013.

Your reply however does not address the issues I have risen with Experian and your letter does contain a major inaccuracy. It also does not address what I put to you as illegal harassment whilst the acknowledged disputed accounts were on their way to court.

The Issues you are failing to address:

1) You say in your letter of 12. December 2013 that you do not consider the accounts in dispute. Not according to your Stacey Shaw, Customer Relationship Manager of Barclaycard who on 28 07 09 admitted a dispute so we are dealing with Barclaycard who have already admitted a dispute, have seriously harassed me and my family defaulting me when a case was on its way to court.

2) Through an illegal default you are now preventing me doing normal business and failing to compensate me for this.

3) You say the default will not be removed. I can assure you it will be.

4) I deny owing you any monies, indeed I have already insisted on a compensation payment from you to me.

5) You are wrong in saying that I have the right to refer the matter to the Financial Ombudsman Service as they do not deal with matters like this involving serious harassment, and the tone of your letter seems to mean that you are taking further action against me to make it even more difficult for me to trade normally.

6) I do not recognise “final response” letters as remotely legal as there is a Constitutional demand for us to work through these matters which you seemingly do not seem willing to do.

7) The answers to our questions – where are they?

· Do you believe it is legal for one party to hound another whilst a case is on its way to court?

· Do you believe it is legal for one party to describe itself under another name whilst a court hearing is on the way as it was at this time? (Mercers and Calder are seemingly owned by Barclays so when MSB sent a Cease and desist letter to one – the alleged account was passed to another.)

· Do you believe it is legal to ignore solicitors’ letters asking you to contact them rather than harass us?

· Do you believe it is right to threaten home visits by collectors when a case is on its way to a court hearing?

· During the time the matter was on its way to a court hearing – do you think it is right to refer to a balance in notices – rather than an “alleged” balance?

· During the time the matter was on its way to a court hearing – do you think it is right to “default” EMLG?

· In amongst all this activity – do you think it is right for us to negotiate with people who have behaved in what we would call an unconstitutional way?

8) The McGuffick “test case” clearly recognised a dispute so why not you, the McGuffick case being constitutionally flawed as we have shown to you but on recognition of the cases being a dispute is well recognised and you defaulted me whilst I was taking you to court! Answer this Kelly Stewart and now you are still demanding money from me and I am still awaiting the court case with you as defendant and I as claimant!

9) You fail to deal with the issue of the Daily Mail report of what we are presenting as illegal government interference in these cases, the cases being brought about through a Upper House edict, the Daily Mail reporting the government of the time illegally in my view interfering.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1189746/Government-leads-crackdown-debt-loophole-swindlers.html#ixzz0fbRv9rs5

10) You fail to deal with the issue of the McGuffick “test case” having illegal foreign philosophies and foreign law references in the case illegal under our Constitutional acts.

To conclude Kelly Stewart, your letter does not at all reflect the Constitutional Law of our nation which I apply to this matter. Your reply denies the serious harassment and stress placed on my family and so I ask for a serious reconsideration of your reply. I am very forgiving but will not continue to tolerate a lack of will on your part to seriously address the issues I have raised.

We kept trying to get answers to these questions in 2014

and in 2015 we are still waiting six years on

Barclaycard - who had defaulted a claimant who was taking them to court five years ago did so whilst a defendant, whilst evidence is there on government interference over a House of Lords Edict, and not only that admitted that agencies operating under a different name that belong to them (they say contacted) but we say "seriously harassed" causing great distress:

Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths (claimant) latest letter years on from when this began!

We had just issued a "Notice of Constitutional Breach" on the defendants.

23/04/2014 20:15:01

Kelly Stewart

Customer Relationship Manager

Barclaycard

Customer Relationship Unit

PO Box 5402

NORTHAMPTON

NN4 1ZR

Dear Kelly Stewart,

Re. Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths

Your ref. A1167074

Our Ongoing Dispute which now goes back 28 04 09

Thank you for your letter of 11. April 2014.

Please note from the Constitutional Acts of Great Britain the authority given to clergy of the realm to ensure our Constitution is kept to. Receiving a Notice of Breach from such clergy is very serious indeed and our case along with many others coming out in the open will continue to expose the considerable corruption, well documented there has been in the banking industry.

However, we are still attempting to bring this matter to a conclusion and this can occur to you answering these simple questions with the obvious constitutional answer. We have asked Experian to answer these questions but seemingly they refuse to do so we are asking you.

These questions relate to the fundamental constitutional right of a claimant to withdraw payment from a defendant in a dispute and indeed not be harassed in that time with companies masquerading under a different name which you admit belong to you, hence our Notice of Constitutional Breach on you.

What we are attacking here is your policy of recording defaults without giving us the claimant’s opportunity to put our side on the credit file, highly illegal under British Constitutional Law but obviously legal under your global law, which is highly illegal in Great Britain.

These are the questions which we have asked Experian and are asking you:

Are you saying that a financial institution can legally default a customer whilst a disputed account is on its way to court, the customer having withheld payment until hearing the court result? YES OR NO

Please answer – YES OR NO

Are you saying that if it can be proven that there has been Government interference in a court hearing relating to a customer account in effect overturning an Upper House Hearing that this interference is legal? YES OR NO

Please answer – YES OR NO

If the court cases relating to these accounts can be proven to involve foreign law interference and foreign philosophies alien to the British Constitutional Acts then are you saying the defaults are still legal? YES OR NO

Please answer – YES OR NO

Do you accept that the British Constitutional Acts of 1534, 1559, 1689 and 1700 are still applicable today? YES OR NO

Please answer – YES OR NO

On hearing your “yes” to this then I expect a withdrawal of all adverse comment against me. Your actions have seriously affected my ability to trade. All my undisputed accounts are fully up to date. Was it right for you to pretend to be someone else and mercilessly harass me and my family when I was claimant and you were defendant?

YES OR NO

Please answer – YES OR NO

Yours sincerely

Rev Dr E M Lindsay Griffiths

UPDATE: 12 08 20

UPDATE: 12 08 20

THE JESUS RAPTURE SOON WEBSITE

incorporating the Constitution Keepers

Update: 07 12 24

SECOND ADVENT PROPHETIC ONLINE "CARD" - CLICK HERE

SISTER SITES: https://www.ecctv.org/ ECCTV https://www.thebiblecollegeofwales.org/The Bible College of Wales Original Vision

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The Cases Barclaycard seemingly want to forget all about -

after all Global Law, government interference &

foreign philosophies have won the day - or have they for

THE CONSTITUTION KEEPERS are on the March!

Yet another case of being a claimant, paying your court fees (not returned) and taking a Bank to court in relation to a House of Lords Edict and having the case

mysteriously removed and in effect being found guilty yourself!!!!!!

The Long Events are listed here - Go on! Enjoy!!!!!!!

We wrote on the 8th. February 2012

and we still await answers to the questions and proper response to the logs ........

Kicking the Devil Out of the Banks!
CASE STILL ONGOING IN 2023!

The McGuffick Test Case and how it relates to Barclaycard!

So what we are saying then is being proven right for a deal was done in effect "criminalalising" claimants -

for the greater good!!!!!!

Utilitarianism triumphs over the Constitution!

The Outstanding Barclaycard Invoice from 2012

Letter to Barclaycard 2013 & questions they will not answer!

Not surprisingly Barclays responded negatively -

not much interested it would seem in being a

"Constitution Keeper"!

We kept trying to get answers to these questions in 2014

and in 2015 we are still waiting six years on

MBNA CASE
CLICK HERE

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The Cases Barclaycard seemingly want to forget all about -

after all Global Law, government interference &

foreign philosophies have won the day - or have they for

THE CONSTITUTION KEEPERS are on the March!

Yet another case of being a claimant, paying your court fees (not returned) and taking a Bank to court in relation to a House of Lords Edict and having the case

mysteriously removed and in effect being found guilty yourself!!!!!!

The Long Events are listed here - Go on! Enjoy!!!!!!!

We wrote on the 8th. February 2012

and we still await answers to the questions and proper response to the logs ........

Kicking the Devil Out of the Banks! CASE STILL ONGOING IN 2023!

The McGuffick Test Case and how it relates to Barclaycard!

So what we are saying then is being proven right for a deal was done in effect "criminalalising" claimants -

for the greater good!!!!!!

Utilitarianism triumphs over the Constitution!

The Outstanding Barclaycard Invoice from 2012

Letter to Barclaycard 2013 & questions they will not answer!

Not surprisingly Barclays responded negatively -

not much interested it would seem in being a

"Constitution Keeper"!

We kept trying to get answers to these questions in 2014

and in 2015 we are still waiting six years on

MBNA CASE CLICK HERE

Kicking the Devil Out of the Banks!
CASE STILL ONGOING IN 2023!

MBNA CASE
CLICK HERE